

# A deep-dive into RapperBot C2 operation and DDoS attacks

*Hideyuki Furukawa*

*Cybersecurity Research Institute (CSRI), NICT*






# Overall workflow of IoT malware analysis

Monitoring darknet

Install Honey-pot

Malware analysis



```

if (targs->mask < 0x20) {
  uVar23 = rand_next();
  uVar26 = (uVar26 >> 0x18 | (uVar26 & 0xff0000) >> 8 | (uVar26 & 0xff00) << 8 |
  uVar26 << 0x18) + (uVar23 >> targs->mask);
  local_4c.sin_addr.s_addr =
  uVar26 >> 0x18 | (uVar26 & 0xff0000) >> 8 | (uVar26 & 0xff00) << 8 |
  uVar26 * 0x1000000;
}
connect(r7,&local_4c,0x10);


```

Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
33	8.042485743	192.168.0.6	198.224.39.178	TCP	60 59547 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=30701 L
35	8.043831897	198.224.39.178	192.168.0.6	TCP	58 22 → 59547 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1
36	8.045826538	192.168.0.6	198.224.39.178	TCP	60 59547 → 22 [RST] Seq=1 Win=0 Len=0
37	8.045826555	192.168.0.6	198.224.39.178	TCP	60 59547 → 22 [RST] Seq=1 Win=0 Len=0
38	8.050965525	192.168.0.6	69.63.1.229	TCP	74 49932 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Li
40	8.051522657	69.63.1.229	192.168.0.6	TCP	74 22 → 49932 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1
41	8.055827161	192.168.0.6	69.63.1.229	TCP	66 49932 → 22 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=6
43	8.057638145	192.168.0.6	69.63.1.229	SSHv2	86 Client: Protocol (SSH-2.0-HELLMORI
45	8.058882241	69.63.1.229	192.168.0.6	TCP	66 22 → 49932 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=21 Win=1
46	8.060939628	69.63.1.229	192.168.0.6	SSHv2	108 Server: Protocol (SSH-2.0-OpenSSH.1
47	8.063175377	192.168.0.6	69.63.1.229	TCP	66 49932 → 22 [ACK] Seq=21 Ack=43 Win=
49	8.063185396	69.63.1.229	192.168.0.6	SSHv2	1148 Server: Key Exchange Init
50	8.063620814	192.168.0.6	69.63.1.229	SSHv2	338 Client: Key Exchange Init
52	8.063757879	69.63.1.229	192.168.0.6	TCP	66 22 → 49932 [ACK] Seq=1123 Ack=293
53	8.065993498	192.168.0.6	69.63.1.229	SSHv2	338 Client: Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
55	8.069284538	69.63.1.229	192.168.0.6	TCP	66 22 → 49932 [ACK] Seq=1123 Ack=565
56	8.071329292	69.63.1.229	192.168.0.6	SSHv2	1170 Server: Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
57	8.101218310	192.168.0.6	69.63.1.229	SSHv2	82 Client: New Keys
59	8.101232771	69.63.1.229	192.168.0.6	TCP	66 22 → 49932 [ACK] Seq=2227 Ack=581
60	8.105321291	192.168.0.6	69.63.1.229	SSHv2	118 Client: Encrypted packet (len=52)
62	8.105485311	69.63.1.229	192.168.0.6	TCP	66 22 → 49932 [ACK] Seq=2227 Ack=633
63	8.105557223	69.63.1.229	192.168.0.6	SSHv2	118 Server: Encrypted packet (len=52)
64	8.107797492	192.168.0.6	69.63.1.229	SSHv2	150 Client: Encrypted packet (len=84)
66	8.154673884	69.63.1.229	192.168.0.6	TCP	66 22 → 49932 [ACK] Seq=2279 Ack=717
67	9.553298356	69.63.1.229	192.168.0.6	SSHv2	134 Server: Encrypted packet (len=68)



# What is the RapperBot?

- One of the Mirai botnets for DDoS attack.
- Named from an embedded [YouTube rap music address](#) in 2022.
- Linux-based IoT devices (especially [DVRs](#)) are compromised.
- Propagation with 4 scanner type variants : [SSH scan](#), [Telnet scan](#), [HTTP+ \(Recon\) scan](#) and [No scan](#)
- About [60,000](#) infected devices in 2025
- Alleged administrator [Ethan J Foltz \(22\)](#) was arrested on August 6, 2025, in Oregon, US.  
And, the C2 servers were seized by the DCIS.  
(Defense Criminal Investigation Service)





# About 60,000 Infected Devices in 2025

TLP:AMBER

4

Content redacted – available to in-person attendees only



# DDoS attack on X on March 10, 2025

**Correlating RapperBot C2 Commands with X Downtime**

- RapperBot C2 attack timing exactly aligns with observed outage in ThousandEyes

2025-03-10

botconf2025


CBS NEWS

**MONEYWATCH**

**X is down for some users, with Musk claiming a cyberattack is hitting the social media service**

By Megan Gerullo  
Edited By Aimee Picchi  
Updated on March 10, 2025 / 3:36 PM EDT / CBS News

- ❑ RapperBot should be responsible for DDoS attack on X according to the attack timings.
- ❑ Analyzing the real operation of such large-scale botnet is important to understand the DDoS threat.



- ❑ We analyzed the last 5-month C2 commands.



## 1. Malware analysis

- Key specifications of RapperBot for the C2 command observation
- Outline of the python script for C2 command observation

## 2. C2 operation analysis


- User Interface of DDoS Service
- Poor support of the usage

## 3. DDoS attack analysis

- DDoS attack landscape
- Individual attack examples


## 4. Summary

# Malware analysis





# Overview of RapperBot





# 3 Years Analysis of the RapperBot

TLP:AMBER

9

Content redacted – available to in-person attendees only



# C2 Protocol Format

Command (CMD) and **data** are XORed by Key.

Compatible from 2024-Oct

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F	
0	Total Size				Data Size			Checksum			Key	CMD					
10	<b>Data Sample of CMD=1</b>										Host Name						
20	<b>(Send victim device information to C2)</b>																
30	Execution Directory																
40																	
50	Argument												MAC address				
60	NIC name																
70			00	00	00	Scan	Global IP				Local IP			Random ID			
80			CPU			Random Footer (Length is also random)											
90																	

Scan ... 0: No-scanner variant / 1: Scanner enabled variant


CPU ... CPU Architecture (0004: ARMv7 / 0003: ARMv6 / 0002: ARMv5 / 0001: ARMv4 / 0006: MIPSel)



# Basic C2 Communication

Bot

C2 server





# All C2 Command List

TLP:CLEAR

12

C2 -> Bot		Bot -> C2	
No	Operation	No	Operation
		1	Send victim information
2	Request sending UDP packet with fake source IP (8.8.8.8) to all C2 IPs in the list		
		3	Beacon (with randomly keep-alive command request)
4	No operation (Keep Alive)		
5	Start DoS attack		
6	Stop DoS attack		
8	Finish all processes		
9	Allocate memory for proxy		
10	Free memory for proxy		
11	Add/Update proxy connection	11	Send proxy connection information
12	Send data received from C2 to proxy connection	12	Send data received from proxy connection to C2
13	Close proxy connection	13	Send ID of closed proxy connection
		14	Report SCAN result (Login successful)
		15	Report SCAN result (Console output from Malware detected)
		16	Report SCAN result (Reserved. Not used.)

} Kill switch

} Proxy

} Report scan results



# DDoS Attack Command Format

Command (CMD) and **data** are XORed by Key.

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F
0	Total Size				Data Size				Checksum		Key	CMD	Vector	IP len	Opt len	Attack
10	ID	Duration (S)			IP				Prefix	IP				Prefix		
20	IP		Prefix	OptID	Size	OptData				OptID	Size	OptData				
30	OptID	Size														
40																
50	OptData															
60	<b>Data Sample of CMD=5 (Start DoS Attack)</b>															
70																
80	Random Footer (Length is also random)															
90																



# DDoS Attack Vectors (Mirai-based)

## Mirai

ID	Description
0	UDP (Straight up UDP flood)
1	VSE (Valve Source Engine query flood)
2	DNS (DNS water torture)
3	SYN (SYN flood with options)
4	ACK (ACK flood)
5	STOMP (ACK flood to bypass mitigation devices)
6	GREIP (GRE IP flood)
7	GREETH (GRE Ethernet flood)
8	Not used
9	UDP PLAIN (Plain UDP flood optimized for speed)
10	HTTP (HTTP layer 7 flood)

## RapperBot

ID	Description
0	UDP flood (UDP socket)
1	UDP flood (Raw socket)
2	Not used (~25-Mar:Valve Source Engine query flood with Monero message)
3	UDP Amp
4	TCP flood
5	Not used (link to ID 4)
6	ACK flood (Raw socket)
7	TCP stomp flood (Raw socket)
8	TCP data flood (TCP socket)
9	GRE flood
10	Not used (link to ID 9)
11	HTTP(S) flood
12	TCP connection flood (TCP socket)

1. Some vectors are integrated. SYN flood and ACK flood were integrated into TCP flood.
2. DNS Water Torture Attack was removed.
3. TLS1.2 HTTPS attack was enabled from April 2025.
4. UDP amplification attack was added on October 2024. (Not covered in our investigation)



# DDoS Attack Options (Mirai-based)

## Mirai

ID	Description
0	PAYLOAD_SIZE
1	PAYLOAD_RAND
2	IP_TOS
3	IP_IDENT
4	IP_TTL
5	IP_DF
6	S_PORT
7	D_PORT
8	DOMAIN
9	DNS_HDR_ID
10	Not used
11	URG
12	ACK
13	PSH
14	RST
15	SYN
16	FIN
17	SEQRND
18	ACKRND
19	GRE_CONSTIP
20	METHOD
21	POST_DATA
22	PATH
23	HTTPS
24	CONN
25	SOURCE


## RapperBot

ID	Description
0	Data size of DoS packet.
1	1: Update random data on every packets. 0: No change.
2	ToS
3	IP ID (0xFFFF = random)
4	TTL
5	Don't Fragment flag.
6	Source Port (0xFFFF = random)
7	Destination Port (0xFFFF = random)
8	URG
9	ACK
10	PSH
11	RST
12	SYN
13	FIN
14	Sequence Number (0xFFFF = random)
15	ACK Sequence Number (0xFFFF = random)
16	Same Destination IP in GRE encapsulated packet flag. Or, random.
17	Number of HTTP connections
18	Source IP
19	1: Same Window size with the response flag. 0: Random.
20	One sec. sleep interval count max.
21	One sec. sleep interval count min.
22	Max value of Random data length
23	Min value of Random data length
24	Micro sec sleep for each attack
25	Data content of DoS packets.
26	Not used.
27	GRE type number
28	HTTP method
29	POST data
30	HTTP path
31	Not used.
32	HTTP URL
33	URL resolve flag
34	TLS flag

24 of 33 options are the same.



# C2 Server connection flow





# Challenges for C2 command observation

## ● Cipher algorithms

### DNS record


TXT "W4wBYDNdY5QSSstJxPLFSn6bVEQjidB

### C2 command data

```
do {
  plaintext = cmddata + index;
  index = index + 1;
  *encdata = *plaintext ^ header[offset + 2];
  encdata = encdata + 1;
} while (index < data_len);
```

XOR

## ● C2 handshake



Try & error to understand C2 side action

## ● Victim information

### Argument

chmod 777 .f; ./f funny

### Current directory

/var/tmp

### Host name

localhost

## ● Proper command response

### Kill switch

```
case 8:
if (*(int *) (pbVar16 + 4) == 0)
  local_44 = 99;
close((int)c2socket);
kill_attack_process(0);
write(DAT_0002cb80, &local_44, 4);
kill(-daemon_sid, 9);
exit(0);
```

### Beacon

```
if (beacon_timer <= beacon_count)
  uVar15 = get_random_range(24, 6);
uVar6 = rand_next();
local_34[2] = (byte)uVar6 & 1;
local_34_0_2_ = (ushort)(byte)(
  local_34[3] = '\0';
  c2_send((int)c2socket, 3, (byte *)
```



## Get C2 server ip list

```
def update_iplist():
    global C2ADDR, c2len
    C2ADDR.clear()
    c2len = 0
    a = ["EICp", "YFrV", "kHbW", "KDXA"]
    #b = ["ByxwGIMPbwiSkniw", "gwYhHCOrybwjWuzh", "GaihWstPZUoMtfnU", "zkUAFIMFDwVETXJQ"]
    b = ["GaihWstPZUoMtfnU"]
    c = ["live", "info"]
    for i in a:
        for j in b:
            for k in c:
                txtout = subprocess.run(["dig", i+"."+j+"."+k, "txt"], capture_output=True, text=True).stdout
                txtlines = txtout.splitlines()
                for line0 in txtlines:
                    if line0.find(i+"."+j+"."+k) == 0:
                        linesplit = line0.split()
                        if len(linesplit) == 5:
                            if linesplit[4][0] == "\":
                                ipencrypt = linesplit[4].replace("\", "")
                                ipdecrypt = call_decode56(["/home/user/c/d", ipencrypt]).replace("\n", "")
                                if ipdecrypt == "error":
                                    ...
                                else:
                                    ipdecryptsplit = ipdecrypt.split("|")
                                    for splitip in ipdecryptsplit:
                                        ipchksplitip = re.sub("[^0-9.]", "", splitip)
                                        if len(ipchksplitip) > 7:
                                            C2ADDR.append(ipchksplitip)
                                            c2len += 1
                                        else:
                                            ...
```

Generate 4x4(1)x2 = 32(8)  
C2 FQDNs

Jun 17: Xlab blog  
Jun 18: Remove sinkhole domains

Get DNS txt record  
by dig command

Decrypt txt record  
to IP list



# How to make the decryption function


- Find a signature & use existing library (Not applicable for RapperBot)

```
if (1 < (uint)c2conn->c2_conn_state) {  
    local_68._16_4_ = *(undefined4 *)c2conn->key;  
    builtin_strncpy(local_68, "expand 32-byte k", 0x10);  
}
```

ChaCha20

- Analyze all decryption code & create the new python code
- Copy decompiled code & take effort to correct compilation errors

```
49 uVar2 = uVar1 - 2;  
50 if (0x163 < (int)uVar2) {  
51     return (char *)0x0;  
52 }  
53 iVar9 = 1;  
54 do {  
55     local_108[iVar9] = iVar9;  
56     iVar9 = iVar9 + 1;  
57 } while (iVar9 != 0x38);  
58 uVar11 = uVar11 + uVar10 * 0x38;  
59 iVar9 = 0x37;  
60 local_108[0] = 0;  
61 uVar10 = uVar11;  
62 do {  
63     uVar10 = count_chk1 * uVar10 + 0x3039 & DAT_0002c7d0;  
64     uVar4 = FUN_0001aaf6(uVar10, iVar9 + 1);  
65     iVar6 = local_108[iVar9];  
66     local_108[iVar9] = local_108[uVar4];  
67     iVar9 = iVar9 + -1;  
68     local_108[uVar4] = iVar6;  
69 } while (iVar9 != 0);  
70 a1Stack lec[local_108[0] + 1] = 0;
```



```
80 if (0x163 < (int)uVar2) {  
81     return (char *)0x0;  
82 }  
83 iVar8 = 1;  
84 do {  
85     local_108[iVar8] = iVar8;  
86     iVar8 = iVar8 + 1;  
87 } while (iVar8 != 0x38);  
88 uVar10 = uVar10 + uVar9 * 0x38;  
89 iVar8 = 0x37;  
90 local_108[0] = 0;  
91 uVar9 = uVar10;  
92 do {  
93     uVar9 = count_chk1 * uVar9 + 0x3039 & DAT_000273d4_ffff;  
94     uVar4 = FUN_00015a60(uVar9, iVar8 + 1);  
95     iVar6 = local_108[iVar8];  
96     local_108[iVar8] = local_108[uVar4];  
97     iVar8 = iVar8 - 1;  
98     local_108[uVar4] = iVar6;  
99 } while (iVar8 != 0);
```



# C2 command observation script

## CMD1: Send victim information (only once after C2 server connection)

```
def c2_victiminfo(sock, disp):
    global beacon_count, c2state, beacon_timer, info_uname_n, info_cwd, info_argument ,info_macaddr ¥
    , info_nic, info_scanner, info_global_ip, info_local_ip, info_random, info_arch
    # Make Victim machine information
    s0 = info_uname_n + info_cwd + info_argument + info_macaddr + info_nic + info_scanner + info_global_ip ¥
    + info local ip + info random + info arch
    # Send Victim machine information
    c2_send(sock, 1, s0, disp)
    sock.setblocking(False)
    beacon_count=0
    c2state=0
    beacon_timer=random.randrange(6,12)

def c2_send(sock, cmd, senddata, disp):
    ...
    idatalen = len(senddata)
    datalen = idatalen.to_bytes(4, byteorder='big')
    itotalen = 4+4+2+1+1+idatalen+footerlen
    totalen = itotalen.to_bytes(4, byteorder='big')
    ikey = random.randrange(1,0xff)
    key = ikey.to_bytes(1, byteorder='big')
    icommand = cmd^ikey
    command = icommand.to bytes(1, byteorder='big')
    chksum0 = ((((((idatalen & 255) % 255 + ((idatalen << 16) >> 24)) % 255 + ((idatalen << 8) >> 24)) % 255 ¥
    + (idatalen >> 24)) % 255 + icommand) % 255).to_bytes(1, byteorder='big')
    chksum1 = ((((((itotalen & 255) % 255 + ((itotalen << 16) >> 24)) % 255 + ((itotalen << 8) >> 24)) % 255 ¥
    + (itotalen >> 24)) % 255 + ikey ) % 255).to bytes(1, byteorder='big')
    s0xor=b''
    for s00 in senddata:
        s0xor = s0xor + (s00^ikey).to bytes(1, 'big')
    s = totalen + datalen + chksum1 + chksum0 + key + command + s0xor + footer
    sock.send(s)
```

Victim information

Generate checksum

Encode data by simple XOR

Send it to C2 server



# C2 command observation script

TLP:AMBER

21

Content redacted – available to in-person attendees only



## Selector loop to handle C2 communication

```
sel0 = selectors.DefaultSelector()
sel0.register(botsock, selectors.EVENT_READ, FD_C2SOCK)
#####
# C2 command loop
#####
while True:
    # wait selector event for 10 seconds.
    events = sel0.select(10)
    ...
    # No command received.
    if not events:
        print('.', end='', flush=True, file=f)
        c2conntimer += 1
        # when no command is received for 20 minutes, disconnect C2 and reconnect.
        if c2conntimer > 120:
            sel0.unregister(botsock)
            botsock = c2_connect(botsock)
            c2_victiminfo(botsock, False)
            sel0.register(botsock, selectors.EVENT_READ, FD_C2SOCK)
            c2conntimer = 0
        else:
            beacon_count += 1
            # when beacon count exceeds the timer count, enable WRITE event to send beacon.
            if beacon_count > beacon_timer:
                sel0.unregister(botsock)
                sel0.register(botsock, selectors.EVENT_WRITE, FD_C2SOCK)
                c2state=1
```

10 sec. wait for C2 command

Change C2 server when no command is received for 20 minutes

Send beacon CMD 3 when beacon timer is timed out.



## C2 command handler

```
# Event handler
else:
    for key, mask in events:
        if key.data == FD_C2SOCK:
            # Data from C2
            if mask & selectors.EVENT_READ:
                try:
                    data = botsock.recv(12)
                except:
                    data = ''
                if len(data) == 12:
                    itotalen = int.from_bytes([data[0],data[1],data[2],data[3]], 'big')
                    idatalen = int.from_bytes([data[4],data[5],data[6],data[7]], 'big')
                    ikey = int.from_bytes([data[10]], 'big')
                    icommand = int.from_bytes([data[11]], 'big')
                    ixcommand = icommand^ikey
                    if ixcommand == 4:
                        print('#', end='', flush=True, file=f)
                    elif ixcommand == 2:
                        print('$', end='', flush=True, file=f)
                    else:
                        cmdcount = cmdcount + 1
                        if cmdcount > 5000:
                            print('\n=====Command receive count over.\n', end='', file=f)
                            ...
                    iremain = itotalen - 12
                    beacon_count = 0
                    c2conntimer = 0
                    while(iremain > 0):
                        bufsize0 = iremain
                        if iremain > BUFSIZE:
                            iremain = BUFSIZE
                        try:
                            data2 = botsock.recv(iremain)
                        except:
                            data2 = b''
                        ...
```


Receive 12 bytes header

Parse header

For DDoS attack to this script with dummy C2 commands

Receive command data

# C2 operation analysis





## DDoS attack command example < Case 1 >

04010229c90000003c [REDACTED] 200704390838300c0131

Target Port = 9 8 0

08 = BS (Back Space)

Typo is not corrected by BS which is recorded as a part of the command strings.

## DDoS attack command example < Case 2 >

05010382f90000003c [REDACTED] 200901310702383000053134343000

Payload size = 1 4 4 0

00 = Null termination

This user could use some macro to input the commands.

**User Interface = Console-based application**



## Poor support of the usage

TLP:CLEAR

26

### DDoS attack command example < Case 3 >

```
09010567d6000000b4[REDACTED]20040236340501310004313032340101311b0449505636
```

**GRE type = I P V 6**

GRE type must be the Ethertype value: IPv4=0x0800(2048) / IPv6=0x86DD(34525)  
IPv6 (0x86DD) is not available in RapperBot. (replaced to the default type IPv4)

### DDoS attack command example < Case 4 >

```
000103bf600000003c[REDACTED]16170333363416043130353006103434332c38302c35332c32322c313739
```

**Source port = 4 4 3 , 8 0 , 5 3 , 2 2 , 1 7 9**

Multiple port numbers with ", " delimiter is not allowed.

**Usage is not properly explained to users.**



# DDoS-for-hire control panel

TLP:AMBER

27

Content redacted – available to in-person attendees only




# C2 Server Application

TLP:AMBER

28

Content redacted – available to in-person attendees only

# DDoS attack analysis





*"from **April 2025** to early August, Rapper Bot conducted over **370,000** attacks, targeting 18,000 unique victims across 1,000 networks, with the bulk of victims residing in **China, Japan, the United States, Ireland and Hong Kong (in that order)**."*

<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2025/08/oregon-man-charged-in-rapper-bot-ddos-service/>

How should we count the attacks? (Our dataset : Mar-2 ~ Aug-6)


Attack command count ...	<b>40,531</b>
Attacked IP count ...	<b>397,509</b> ( <b>15,329</b> unique IPs)
Total attack duration ...	<b>2,780,918 [S]</b> ( <b>32.2 days</b> )






# DDoS Attack Landscape

### Number of Target IPs in a Command (Total Duration)




### Prefix of Target IP (Total Duration)



**Multiple IPs /  
Command**  
**55%**



### Top attacked countries and regions (Total duration)



### Top attacked server types (Total duration)




Chinese game servers are the major target.



# DDoS Attack Landscape

## Attack Vectors (Total duration)





# DDoS attack on Game Server

## Command Data

000102abda0000003c[REDACTED]20070532373031351900000019ffffffff54536f7572636520456e67696e6520517565727900

Vector

00 = UDP flood

Target Port

27015

Payload data

FFFFFFFF"TSource Engine Query"00

## Request of the game server information

### Request Format

Data	Type	Value
Header	byte	'T' (0x54)
Payload	string	"Source Engine Query\0"
Challenge	long	4-byte challenge (sometimes -- see below)

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
5034	21.277976886	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].21.67	UDP	67	31662 → 27015 Len=25
5035	21.277976904	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].21.67	UDP	67	31662 → 27015 Len=25
5036	21.277976922	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].21.67	UDP	67	31662 → 27015 Len=25
5037	21.277976936	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].21.67	UDP	67	31662 → 27015 Len=25
5038	21.277976955	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].21.67	UDP	67	31662 → 27015 Len=25
5039	21.277976971	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].21.67	UDP	67	31662 → 27015 Len=25
5040	21.278083009	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].21.67	UDP	67	31662 → 27015 Len=25
5041	21.278083032	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].21.67	UDP	67	31662 → 27015 Len=25
5042	21.278288509	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].21.67	UDP	67	31662 → 27015 Len=25
5043	21.278288544	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].21.67	UDP	67	31662 → 27015 Len=25
5044	21.278404452	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].21.67	UDP	67	31662 → 27015 Len=25
5045	21.278404474	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].21.67	UDP	67	31662 → 27015 Len=25
5046	21.278404494	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].21.67	UDP	67	31662 → 27015 Len=25
5047	21.278527931	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].21.67	UDP	67	31662 → 27015 Len=25
5048	21.278527953	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].21.67	UDP	67	31662 → 27015 Len=25
5049	21.278527979	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].21.67	UDP	67	31662 → 27015 Len=25
5050	21.278528000	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].21.67	UDP	67	31662 → 27015 Len=25
5051	21.278528020	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].21.67	UDP	67	31662 → 27015 Len=25

0000	08 00 27 90 58 ec 52 54	00 12 34 56 08 00 45 00	..'.X·RT ..4V·E·
0010	00 35 6f 5c 40 00 40 11	40 af c0 a8 00 05 [REDACTED]	·5o\@·@· @·.....
0020	15 43 7b ae 69 87 00 21	d1 0f ff ff ff ff 54 53	·C{i·!· ····TS
0030	6f 75 72 63 65 20 45 6e	67 69 6e 65 20 51 75 65	ource Engine Que
0040	72 79 00		ry·



# DDoS attack on Game Server

## Legitimate Client

Server info request → Server

```

0020 02 88 c7 ef 69 87 00 21 88 e4 ff ff ff ff 54 53 .....i...!..TS
0030 6f 75 72 63 65 20 45 6e 67 69 6e 65 20 51 75 65 ource En gine Que
0040 72 79 00

```

Client ← Challenge number

```

0020 02 be 69 87 c7 ef 00 11 86 b9 ff ff ff ff 41 44
0030 2d 06 0f

```

Challenge response → Server

```

0020 02 88 c7 ef 69 87 00 25 4c 92 ff ff ff ff 54 53 .....i...% L...TS
0030 6f 75 72 63 65 20 45 6e 67 69 6e 65 20 51 75 65 ource En gine Que
0040 72 79 00 44 2d 06 0f

```

Client ← Server Information

```

0020 02 be 69 87 c7 ef 00 62 87 0a ff ff ff ff 49 11 .....i....b...I.
0030 4d 79 54 65 61 6d 46 6f 72 74 72 65 73 73 32 00 MyTeamFo rtress2.
0040 63 74 66 5f 32 66 6f 72 74 00 74 66 00 54 65 61 ctf_2for t.tf.Tea
0050 6d 20 46 6f 72 74 72 65 73 73 00 b8 01 01 18 00 m Fortre ss.....
0060 64 77 00 00 31 30 31 39 35 33 38 35 00 b1 87 69 dw..1019 5385...i
0070 12 50 a7 b9 cb ba 40 01 63 74 66 00 b8 01 00 00 .P...@. ctf....
0080 00 00 00 00

```

## DoS attack

Challenge number

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
4510	609.478823	192.168.2.190	192.168.2.136	UDP	67	54474 → 27015 Len=25
4511	609.488125	192.168.2.136	192.168.2.190	UDP	51	27015 → 54474 Len=9
4708	676.554962	192.168.2.190	192.168.2.136	UDP	67	54552 → 27015 Len=25
4709	676.556547	192.168.2.190	192.168.2.136	UDP	67	54552 → 27015 Len=25
4710	676.556547	192.168.2.190	192.168.2.136	UDP	67	54552 → 27015 Len=25
4711	676.556547	192.168.2.190	192.168.2.136	UDP	67	54552 → 27015 Len=25
4712	676.556547	192.168.2.190	192.168.2.136	UDP	67	54552 → 27015 Len=25
4713	676.556547	192.168.2.190	192.168.2.136	UDP	67	54552 → 27015 Len=25
4714	676.556547	192.168.2.190	192.168.2.136	UDP	67	54552 → 27015 Len=25
4715	676.556547	192.168.2.190	192.168.2.136	UDP	67	54552 → 27015 Len=25
4716	676.556547	192.168.2.190	192.168.2.136	UDP	67	54552 → 27015 Len=25
4717	676.556547	192.168.2.190	192.168.2.136	UDP	67	54552 → 27015 Len=25
4718	676.556547	192.168.2.190	192.168.2.136	UDP	67	54552 → 27015 Len=25
4719	676.556547	192.168.2.190	192.168.2.136	UDP	67	54552 → 27015 Len=25
4720	676.558311	192.168.2.190	192.168.2.136	UDP	67	54552 → 27015 Len=25
4721	676.558311	192.168.2.190	192.168.2.136	UDP	67	54552 → 27015 Len=25

Server info request

All requests except the 1st one will be ignored by the source engine.



# DDoS attack with a threatening message

## Command Data

0201006fa40000003c[REDACTED]18

## Vector

02 = UDP flood with Threatening message to the game server



Removed from March 30, 2025

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Prot	Length	Info
4221	103.0755002...	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].227.219	UDP	278	12748 → 27015 Len=236
4222	103.0756834...	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].227.56	UDP	278	25093 → 27015 Len=236
4223	103.0756834...	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].227.238	UDP	278	41814 → 27015 Len=236
4224	103.0756835...	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].227.13	UDP	278	16316 → 27015 Len=236
4225	103.0756835...	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].227.213	UDP	278	54410 → 27015 Len=236
4226	103.0756835...	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].227.122	UDP	278	19231 → 27015 Len=236
4227	103.0756836...	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].227.162	UDP	278	42058 → 27015 Len=236
4228	103.0758782...	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].227.205	UDP	278	4265 → 27015 Len=236
4229	103.0758782...	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].227.231	UDP	278	38042 → 27015 Len=236
4230	103.0758782...	192.168.0.5	[REDACTED].227.21	UDP	278	46448 → 27015 Len=236

FFFFFFFF"Donate \$5,000 in **XMR** to (48SFiWgbAaFf75KsRSEEr4iDcxrevFzVmhgfb6Qudss52JK8cCR8bwmUxNBPN2VmQDTucJL3eabiZc5XRYVGkbh6BH58Ytk) to be blacklisted from this and future botnets from us."



# DDoS attack on Online Gambling Site

## Command Data

Command Data	IP1	IP2	IP3	IP4	IP5	IP6	IP7	IP8	...	
002402347e00000078	2261	20225c	20225c	202292	202292	2023ea	202261	2023dd	202257	20
2260	202292	202292	202257	2023c9	202261	202292	202255	2023f3	202254	202250
202254	202261	2023dc	206ba7	2023c8	202257	206ba7	204020	206ba7	2017e1	2017e1
2017e1	2017e1	202e95	201b7c	207b6c	2007023830000431343430					

36 IPs in a command of 120 seconds UDP flood (3.3 Sec/IP)

JP, US, HK, TW, SG

Google Cloud "asia-northeast1"



*"The government says Rapper Bot's most lucrative and frequent customers were involved in extorting online businesses — including numerous gambling operations based in China."*

<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2025/08/oregon-man-charged-in-rapper-bot-ddos-service/>




# DDoS attack on X (Twitter)

TLP:CLEAR

## DoS attack commands aligned with observed service outages


2025-03-10

Duration of DoS attack command targeted AS13414 (Twitter Inc.)



Availability  Overlay  Off  Agents

Availability plot for X by Cisco ThousandEyes



<https://x.com/thousandeyes/status/1899235104335262148>



# DDoS attack on X (Twitter)

TLP:AMBER

40

Content redacted – available to in-person attendees only



# DDoS attack on X (Twitter)

TLP:AMBER

41

Content redacted – available to in-person attendees only



# DDoS attack on X (Twitter)

TLP:AMBER

42

Content redacted – available to in-person attendees only



# Layer 7 HTTPS attack

TLP:AMBER

43

Content redacted – available to in-person attendees only



## 'Client Hello' fingerprint

```
▼ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
  Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)
  Length: 94
  Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
  ▶ Random: 68bbeeba7ccc4c23be21e3f41f5deae3ef6182b170e9e829b71104f01bf5b2e3
  Session ID Length: 0
  Cipher Suites Length: 2
  ▼ Cipher Suites (1 suite)
    Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x002f)
  Compression Methods Length: 1
  ▶ Compression Methods (1 method)
  Extensions Length: 51
  ▼ Extension: application_layer_protocol_negotiation (len=11)
    Type: application_layer_protocol_negotiation (16)
    Length: 11
    ALPN Extension Length: 9
    ▶ ALPN Protocol
  ▼ Extension: server_name (len=22) name=api-v2.nova.trade
    Type: server_name (0)
    Length: 22
    ▶ Server Name Indication extension
  ▼ Extension: signature_algorithms (len=6)
    Type: signature_algorithms (13)
    Length: 6
    Signature Hash Algorithms Length: 4
    ▼ Signature Hash Algorithms (2 algorithms)
      ▶ Signature Algorithm: ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 (0x0503)
      ▶ Signature Algorithm: rsa_pss_pss_sha256 (0x0809)
```

```
[JA4: t12d0103h1_ba72b8082249_aa69e3af4743]
[JA4_r: t12d0103h1_002f_000d_0503_0809]
[JA3 Fullstring: 771,47,16-0-13,,]
[JA3: 4b57189289f3b1839850ed0c64089584]
```

Randomly changed



# DDoS attack on Enterprises

TLP:AMBER

45

Content redacted – available to in-person attendees only



# Why there was no second attack on X ?

TLP:AMBER

46

Content redacted – available to in-person attendees only



# Blacklisted Targets

TLP:AMBER


47

Content redacted – available to in-person attendees only





# Summary



**Vulnerable devices are still there...**



# Thank you!

# Questions?

Cybersecurity Research Institute, NICT



**NICTER Blog**

[blog.nicter.jp](http://blog.nicter.jp)



**NICTER Analysis Team**

[@nicter\\_jp](https://twitter.com/nicter_jp)