

NTT DATA

IoC LIGHT


～ Lifecycle of Indicators: **Gathering, Handling, and Termination** ～

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Agenda


1. whoami
2. Introduction
3. Two Challenges in IoCs Management and Approaches
4. IoCs Prioritization Criteria
5. IoCs Lifecycle Model
6. Conclusion



whoami


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- Name: Yusuke Nakajima
- Background:
 - ✓ Joined NTT DATA Group in 2019, focused on providing image processing and NLP solutions
 - ✓ Transferred to NTTDATA-CERT in April 2023, handling incident response, IoC operations, and AI-driven CSIRT improvements
 - ✓ Interested in offensive security, including C2 framework development, open-source vulnerability research, and bug bounty programs



Introduction

- Performed real-time IoC collection, processing, and distribution using MISP as our core threat intelligence platform.
- Streamlined IoCs handling and quickly integrated new IoC sources. During the Emotet outbreak, **this approach allowed us to prevent incidents proactively.**



Two Challenges in IoC Management and Our Approaches

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- Threat trends evolve daily, requiring regular integration of new IoCs.
- Identified two key challenges in IoC management during this process.
 1. IoC registration limits on security devices pose a significant challenge, as failing to filter out low-risk or outdated IoCs can **prevent the timely registration of high-risk, emerging threats, leaving critical gaps in defense (IoC Capacity Constraints)**
 2. Retaining outdated IoCs increases false positives, leading to **alert fatigue and operational inefficiencies in SOC teams (False Positive Fatigue)**

Two Challenges in IoC Management and Our Approaches

- Our approaches to address these challenges are as follows:



No	Challenges	Approaches
1	IoC Capacity Constraints	IoCs Prioritization Criteria <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Analyze IoCs to identify threats relevant to our organization• Categorize IoCs into four priority levels and collect only high-priority IoCs
		IoCs Lifecycle Model <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Develop removal criteria based on quantitative metrics, not qualitative metrics• Ensuring low-risk IoCs are systematically deleted from security devices such as FW, SIEM and so on
2	False Positive Fatigue	

IoCs Prioritization Criteria

IoCs Prioritization Criteria

Overview

- Filtered a large volume of IoCs based on three key criteria: port number, Pyramid of Pain, and custom risk score.
- The Risk Score represents the **sophistication level of the attacker associated with the IoCs**



IoCs Prioritization Criteria

Analysis of Our Security Environment (1/4)

- Security environment aligned with the Cyber Security Framework (CSF).
- External red team assessments confirmed that breaching our environment is challenging.
- Focus shifted to collecting IoCs related to advanced attackers, given **the low risk from unsophisticated threats.**

IoCs Prioritization Criteria

Analysis of Our Security Environment (2/4)

- Established a 24/7 SOC team focused on EDR solutions.
- Acknowledged **limitations of EDR in detecting C2 communications and data exfiltration.**
- **Prioritized C2 detection** as a key focus in our security strategy.

Abuse vector	EDR1		EDR2		EDR3		AV	
	Cobalt	Sliver	Cobalt	Sliver	Cobalt	Sliver	Cobalt	Sliver
C&C channel	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected
Open SOCKS tunnel, e.g. for Network scanning	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected
Data exfiltration	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected
KeyLogger	Detected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected	Undetected

Source: [D1T1 - EDR Evasion Primer for Red Teamers - Karsten Nohl & Jorge Gimenez.pdf](#)


IoCs Prioritization Criteria

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Analysis of Our Security Environment (3/4)

- Firewall restricts traffic to ports 80 and 443, **blocking all other ports.**
- Prioritizing **domain-based IoCs over IP-based IoCs**, as they cause more disruption to attackers (Pyramid of Pain model).

The Pyramid of Pain



Source: <https://www.csnp.org/post/tryhackme-pyramid-of-pain-room>

IoCs Prioritization Criteria

Analysis of Our Security Environment (4/4)

- In summary, the following four elements form the key requirements for IoC filtering:
 1. Associated with advanced attackers
 2. Related to C2 communications and data exfiltration
 3. Limited to ports 80 and 443
 4. Target domains instead of IP addresses

IoCs Prioritization Criteria

Analysis of Our Security Environment (4/4)

- In summary, the following four elements form the key requirements for IoC filtering:

- 1. Associated with advanced attackers**

2. Related to C2 communications and data

3. Limited to ports 80 and 443

4. Target Domains Instead of IP Ad

How to Identify IoCs associated with advanced attackers?

IoCs Prioritization Criteria

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How to Identify IoCs associated with advanced attackers?

Limited availability only at the conference venue

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IoCs Prioritization Criteria

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Risk Score Calculation Logic By NTTDATA-CERT

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IoCs Prioritization Criteria

Risk Score Calculation Logic By NTTDATA-CERT

- Integrated the results of our data analysis with the requirement to prioritize C2-related IoCs to develop a risk score calculation logic.
- The IoC risk is evaluated using a four-level scoring system:
 - ✓ 0 – 30 points: Low
 - ✓ 40 – 60 points: Medium
 - ✓ 70 – 80 points: High
 - ✓ 90 – 100 points: Critical


IoCs Prioritization Criteria

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Risk Score Calculation Logic By NTTDATA-CERT

 Increase  Decrease

- Examples of "Critical" Risk Score is as follows:



IoCs Prioritization Criteria

Real-World Example

- Identified ThreatFox as a **reliable information source with sufficient context.**
- **Registers around 500 IoCs daily, risking capacity overload of security devices.**
- **Manual verification of each IoC's impact on operations is impractical.**

Date (UTC) ↑↓	IOC	Malware	Tags	Reporter
2025-01-06 06:56	103.15.186.10:443	Brute Rate1 C4	as2519 BruteRate1 c2 censys	skocherhan
2025-01-06 06:45	38.49.56.2:56004	AsyncRAT	asynccrat	abuse_ch
2025-01-06 06:45	38.49.56.2:56005	AsyncRAT	asynccrat	abuse_ch
2025-01-06 06:45	38.49.56.2:56003	AsyncRAT	asynccrat	abuse_ch
2025-01-06 06:35	185.194.236.52:443	DeimosC2	AS48314 c2 Deimos shodan	skocherhan

Source: [ThreatFox | Browse IOCs](#)

IoCs Prioritization Criteria

Real-World Example

- Applied IoC Prioritization Criteria to IoC collected from ThreatFox.
- Filtering "High" and "Critical" risk IoCs reduced daily collection to ~80 IoCs.
- Further focusing on domain-based IoCs reduced it to ~50 IoCs per day.
- **Achieved a 90% reduction in collected IoCs**, prioritizing those most relevant to our environment.

No	Items	Total	Low	Medium	High	Critical
1	Total Count (5 Days)	1,420	459	548	398	15
2	After Applying Domain Filter	-	-	-	261	8
3	Daily Average (Rounded Up)	284	-	-	52	2

※ Port-Based Filtering Already Applied

IoCs Lifecycle Model

IoCs Lifecycle Model

Investigation and Interview Findings For IoCs Lifecycle Model

- Investigated essential information for building an IoC lifecycle model.
- Conducted interviews to **identify reasons for retaining outdated IoCs in operations.**
- Key findings from the investigation and interview are summarized below.

No	Items	Findings	Necessary information
1	Investigation	Research focused on past FIRST Conference presentations, with limited information on IoC lifecycle management.	IoCs Lifecycle Characteristics in Our Environment
2	Interview	Found some organizations remove IoCs on fixed cycles (e.g., 3 or 6 months) without clear justification.	
3		SOC team raised concerns about IoC removal, fearing it may result in missed threats, causing hesitation to adopt removal processes.	Data-Driven Removal Criteria


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IoCs Lifecycle Model

Agreement on Lifecycle Model Operations with Stakeholders

- Consulted with SOC team and internal experts on implementing the Lifecycle Model.
- **Approved for operational use after confirming that IoC removal risks were sufficiently mitigated.**
- Lifecycle Model expected to be fully operational by the end of FY2024.

Conclusion



Conclusion

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- Developed the **IoCs Prioritization Criteria** and **Lifecycle Model** to tackle two common challenges:
 1. IoC registration limits on security devices pose a significant challenge, as failing to filter out low-risk or outdated IoCs can **prevent the timely registration of high-risk, emerging threats, leaving critical gaps in defense (IoC Capacity Constraints)**
 2. Retaining outdated IoCs increases false positives, **leading to alert fatigue and operational inefficiencies in SOC teams (False Positive Fatigue)**
- Ensured **prioritization of high-risk, relevant IoCs while systematically removing outdated, low-risk ones to mitigate capacity issues and alert fatigue.**