

Unmasking HiddenFace

MirrorFace's most complex backdoor yet

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Malware Researcher



Digital Security
Progress. Protected.

Unmasking NOOPDOOR

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Dominik Breitenbacher

- Malware researcher @ ESET since 2019
- Research focus
 - MirrorFace – LODEINFO
 - Kimsuky



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dbreitenbacher

Agenda

- ✔ MirrorFace overview
- ✔ HiddenFace (NOOPDOOR)
 - Introduction
 - Execution chain
 - Technical details

MirrorFace


MirrorFace

- ✓ **China-aligned threat actor**
- ✓ **Active at least since 2019**
 - Activity often attributed to APT10
- ✓ **LODEINFO malware unique for the group**
- ✓ **Exclusively targeting Japanese entities (?)**

Victimology



Media



Defense-related
companies



Think tanks



Political entities



Academic institutes



HiddenFace

(NOOPDOOR)

HiddenFace




shellcode




modular



evasive



active and passive
communication



data categorization
system



domain generation
algorithm

Overall complexity and versatility surpasses LODEINFO

Victimology



Media



Defense-related
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Think tanks



Political entities



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How we discovered HiddenFace

- ✓ August 2023
- ✓ Japanese research institute
- ✓ Exploited a vulnerability in FortiOS/FortiProxy
 - **NOT** via spearphishing
- ✓ LODEINFO deployed
 - MirrorFace
- ✓ HiddenFace deployed

Execution Chain


Execution chain - Installation



Scheduled task


Example: `automatic-device-check` or `createobject`

Execution chain - Installation




Example: `diskmgmt.config`, `BrowserSettingSync.xml`, or `BluetoothDesktopHandlers.xml`

Execution chain - Installation




FaceXInjector = NOOPLDR

Execution chain - Installation



Example: [ActivationManager.tlb](#), [LaunchWinApp.dat](#), or [Windows.Devices.Custom.dat](#)

Execution chain - Installation




File content:

SHA-256(AES(payload))

AES material

AES(payload)

Execution chain - Installation




File content:

SHA-256(AES(payload))


AES material

AES(payload)

Execution chain - Installation




Execution chain - Installation



SHA-256(AES(payload))

= **SHA-256(** AES(payload) **) ?**

Execution chain - Installation




SHA-256(AES(payload))

= **SHA-256**(AES(payload))



Execution chain - Installation




SHA-256(AES(payload))


AES material

AES(payload)


Execution chain - Installation




Execution chain - Installation



Execution chain - Installation




Execution chain - Installation




HKLM\Software\Microsoft\SQMClient\MachineId + hostname

Execution chain - Installation




SHA-384(HKLM\Software\Microsoft\SQMClient\MachineId + hostname)

Execution chain - Installation




HKCU|HKLM\Software\License\{<16 hex characters>}


Execution chain - Injection



Execution chain - Injection



Execution chain - Injection



Example: **perfmon.exe**, **wermgr.exe**, or **powercfg.exe**

Startup

Startup

- ✔ **Dynamically resolves Windows APIs**
- ✔ **Performs few defensive actions**
 - Removes API resolution code
→ Memory dump is malformed
 - Restricts DLL loading to Microsoft-signed ones
 - Sleeps randomly in between 30 and 60 seconds
→ Likely to avoid behavioral analysis by sandbox or security solutions
 - Periodically checks running processes against a list of blacklisted applications
 - Debuggers, process monitors, network analysis tools ...

Startup

- ✔ Creates mutex
→ Only one instance at a time
- ✔ Loads external modules
- ✔ Initializes internal framework
- ✔ Starts network communications

Modular System

Modular system

- ✔ Core feature of HiddenFace
- ✔ Module:
Built-in functions or shellcode labeled by ID numbers
- ✔ HiddenFace contains several built-in modules
- ✔ External modules are loaded from a file
- ✔ Additional modules can be sent by an operator
 - Internal framework provided to a module received from a C&C server

External Modules

External modules

- ✔ Stored in a file – AES-256-CBC-encrypted
- ✔ User-specific filename
- ✔ User-specific AES key and IV
- ✔ Algorithmically determined
 - **Hostname** and **username** is used

Note: Most of the assets that are usually hardcoded in malware (e.g., encryption keys, filenames), are generated by HiddenFace.

External modules – Module Entry

Name	Description
Type	Module type (immediate, specific minute, etc.)
ID	ID to identify the module
Tag	(Optional) Additional label for the module
Time	Describes a specific time or a period; used for scheduled execution
Shellcode / Parameters	Contains either the module's shellcode or parameters for a built-in module

External modules – Execution

- ✔ Each module is executed based on its type

Type	Description
Immediate	Immediately and only once
Specific minute	Specified minute every hour
Specific time	Specified time every day
Periodic	Every X minutes
Process monitor periodic	X minutes after the last check for running processes

Internal Framework

Internal framework

- ✔ **Provided to every module received from the C&C server**
- ✔ **Features:**
 - Access and modify external modules
 - Utilize internal memory storage
 - List running modules
 - Changes to the framework itself
- ✔ **Allows to create a tailored environment with needed capabilities**

Internal framework

- ✔ Lookup function is used to obtain and execute desired function

Function ID	Description
CCA8EB22C9E23C5D0577FC1F03060A5E	Add framework function
3D75B9B060499764C13527149E89D8DC	Remove framework function
CF05E89B7EAF28FE0DBF3B771B6C07B7	Write to memory storage
9BB2D76EDA1355D875D1D53DEEAA85B9	Read from memory storage
AC636E53FA3EC973F0E9535C8358C3E9	Remove data from memory storage
AC2BC61134888753316C1AC63DE465FE	Read external modules file
50515EF4F20DAA90B575DFFEAB4A97C0	Add module to external modules file
B5F39B21F0CC65CB1E3C75C6BFB7AB25	Write data to external modules file If no data is provided → file is deleted
1AA52A58C2C7B8E0079FF255D7294E70	Return list of running modules

Active Communication

Active communication

- ✔ **Actively** connects to a C&C server
- ✔ Works in **sessions**
- ✔ Hard-coded **list of C&C URLs (templates)**
- ✔ Uses domain generation algorithm (**DGA**)
- ✔ Uses **custom protocol** over TCP (on port 443)

Active communication – DGA

`http://$n[].tw8sl.com:443/#180`

Symbol	Description
\$n	Variable to replace with a generated string (e.g., sofvvgckcmxixg)
[]	Use hostname in the algorithm → Creates unique domain
#<num>	Increase domain's lifespan to <num> days


TrendMicro's example:

`http://$d.hopto.org:443`

Note: Some of the domains are under direct MirrorFace control.


Active communication – Establishing a session

- ✓ All messages exchanged are encrypted
- ✓ First messages are **RSA-2048** encrypted
 - To send collected information
 - To exchange key materials for a symmetric encryption cipher
- ✓ Symmetric encryption cipher is used until the end of the session
- ✓ Cipher randomly selected by HiddenFace
 - DES, 3DES, two-key 3DES
 - AES-CBC (128/192/256)
 - RC2, RC4



Active communication – Commands handling

- ✓ Commands executed by **modules**
- ✓ Server sends **module ID** and necessary **data**
- ✓ Module ID **not found**
 - Additional temporary module
 - Access to internal framework



Active communication – Commands

Function ID	Description
3B27D4EEFBC6137C23BD612DC7C4A817	Create a process
9AA5BB92E9D1CD212EFB0A5E9149B7E5	Write to a file
3C7660B04EE979FDC29CD7BBFDD05F23	Exfiltrate a file
12E2FC6C22B38788D8C1CC2768BD2C76	Read content from the file named %SystemRoot%\System32\msra.tlb
2D3D5C19A771A3606019C8ED1CD47FB5	Timestomp directory content

*Note: **msra.tlb** contains credentials collected by **MSRAStealer** – MirrorFace’s publicly undescribed stealer.*

MSRAStealer

- ✓ **Passive credentials stealer**
- ✓ **Upon deployment registered as password filter and authentication package**
- ✓ **Password filter**
 - **Legitimate use:** Enforce password policy
 - **MSRAStealer:** collects credentials on a password change
- ✓ **Authentication package**
 - **Legitimate use:** Analyze logon data
 - **MSRAStealer:** collects credentials on user's logon
- ✓ **Collected credentials are dumped into msra.tlb – AES-256-CBC encrypted**
- ✓ **HiddenFace used to exfiltrate the credentials**

Passive Communication

Passive communication

- ✔ Hard-coded list of ports to listen on (e.g., 47000)
- ✔ Windows firewall reconfigured to allow communication
- ✔ Communication AES-128-CBC encrypted
- ✔ AES key and IV generated on:
<year><hour (utc)><day><month>
- ✔ SHA-256 hash = AES key
- ✔ SHA-1 hash = AES IV

Passive communication – Commands

Command ID	Description
0x0BE9	Keep-Alive
0x2359	Create a process
0x235A	Exfiltrate a file
0x235B	Write to a file
0x235C	Set working directory
0x235D	Execute shellcode

*Note: **Execute shellcode** – Shellcode is turned into a module first. Not added to the list of available modules and not provided with the access to the internal framework.*

Data Structuring System

Data structuring system

- ✓ HiddenFace uses system to structure data
- ✓ For communication, but also internally
- ✓ Every structured data blob consists of:
 - Header
 - Metadata
 - Actual data

57	00	00	00	27	00	00	00	W...
04	00	00	00	04	00	00	00
04	00	00	00	01	00	00	00
0B	00	00	00	02	00	00	00
10	00	00	00	03	00	00	00
08	00	00	00	04	00	00	00
42	00	00	00	73	74	72	69	B...stri
6E	67	20	64	61	74	61	DE	ng datab
AD	BE	EF	DE	AD	BE	EF	DE	-¾ï-¾ï
AD	BE	EF	DE	AD	BE	EF	FF	-¾ï-¾ï
FF	00	00	00	00	00	00		ÿ.....

Data structuring system

Header

Offset	Size (bytes)	Description
0	4	Total size in bytes
4	4	Data section size in bytes
8	4	Number of metadata entries
12	4	Maximum possible number of metadata entries

Metadata

Offset	Size (bytes)	Description
0	4	Data size in bytes
4	4	Data type

Data structuring system – Data

- ✔ Consists of arbitrary content
- ✔ Heavily depends on the data's purpose
- ✔ Every data item is categorized and defined in metadata
- ✔ HiddenFace distinguishes **more than 80 data types**

Example 1 – “Exfiltrate a file” command

Data type	Description
0x0BD1	Randomly generated data
0x03E8	Type of message Always set to 0xBE3, representing “Command request”
0x03EA	Receiving thread ID
0x0FA1	Module ID Always set to 3C7660B04EE979FDC29CD7BBFDD05F23, representing “Exfiltrate a file”
0x1389	(Optional) Request tag
0x138C	Item of unknown purpose
0x1772	Name of the file to exfiltrate
0x0BC2	(Optional) Base directory if the filename is relative
0x1774	(Optional) Known file size
0x1775	(Optional) Known last write time
0x1776	(Optional) Chunk information (file offsets)
0x1779	(Optional) Known SHA-1 hash of the file

Example 2 – Data passed internally to run a module

Data type	Description
0x0FA1	Module ID
0x0FA2	(Optional) Module's shellcode
0x1389	(Optional) Tag
0x1390	(Optional) Event name; to limit module's execution to one instance only
0x138C	Item of unknown purpose
0x1398	Internal framework's lookup function

Conclusion

Conclusion

- ✔ HiddenFace (NOOPDOOR) – Backdoor developed and exclusively used by MirrorFace
- ✔ The most complex malware in MirrorFace's arsenal
- ✔ Developed with heavy focus on modularity
→ Can be tailored to current needs
- ✔ Utilizes other interesting techniques and mechanisms
 - DGA, data structuring approach, various anti-detection/-analysis techniques
- ✔ Protective execution chain shows HiddenFace is especially valuable to MirrorFace
- ✔ HiddenFace is a reasonably big project



Thank you.

Note: IOCs after this slide.



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IOCs

IOCs – Files

SHA-1

41ACA6FCF8DF6599764DA638B2BAFD5E3EAD8B
512F3C8953AC079B57D1E13F3B8E97F99A054CE9
85E831EAC0AD5A308394BEB1CB7CE702C754FDB6
D96B05E516E9BB3E0AD8702D162440139E33D972

Scheduled Tasks

c:\windows\system32\tasks\microsoft\windows\user profile service\hiveupload
c:\windows\system32\tasks\microsoft\windows\wininet\cachetask
c:\windows\system32\tasks\microsoft\windows\shell\createobject
c:\windows\system32\tasks\microsoft\windows\workplace join\automatic-device-check
c:\windows\system32\tasks\microsoft\windows\media center\pbdadiscoveryw3

IOCs - Files

FaceXInjector XMLs

C:\Windows\system32\diskmgmt.config
C:\Windows\system32\MusNotification.xml
C:\Windows\system32\NetMgmtIF.xml
C:\Windows\system32\BrowserSettingSync.xml
C:\Windows\system32\BluetoothDesktopHandlers.xml

Encrypted HiddenFace

C:\Windows\system32\ActivationManager.tlb
C:\Windows\system32\ksetup.dat
C:\Windows\system32\LaunchWinApp.dat
C:\Windows\system32\win32k.tlb
C:\Windows\system32\Windows.Devices.Custom.dat

IOCs - Network

MirrorFace-controlled servers

5.180.44[.]139
202.182.118[.]157
207.148.97[.]235

C&C domains

vtfraznzdcns.myvnc[.]com
okzhfafcyumv.foeake[.]org
gjeixinbutely.torefrog[.]com
hopekxpjyqloj.torefrog[.]com
kcxtdemxszb.torefrog[.]com
lrsjvqxvzqua.torefrog[.]com
ogxzarazhzgu.torefrog[.]com
orufdqjuirceapb.torefrog[.]com
smfyuxgkeqiwgqw.torefrog[.]com